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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lawrence v. Texas,' human dignity played a prominent role in
the Supreme Court's constitutional decision-making. In Lawrence,
the Court struck down the Texas sodomy law based on petitioners' lib-
erty interest 2 and the corresponding need to advance the petitioners'
human dignity.3 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, described
the "stigma" of the Texas sodomy statute: "Still, it remains a criminal
offense with all that imports for the dignity of the person charged." 4
Continuing to speak in terms of human dignity, the Court stated,
"[tihe State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime."5 The Court described
human dignity as "central" to petitioners' liberty interest: "These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."6 The Lawrence Court also spoke of petitioners' dignity as
allowing petitioners choices regarding intimate relationships: "It suf-
fices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons."7
The year before Lawrence, in Atkins v. Virginia,8 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether executing a mentally retarded de-
fendant violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. The Court relied specifically on petitioners' liberty interest under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 578. In discussing petitioners'
liberty interest, Justice Kennedy referred to both freedom and autonomy: "Free-
dom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."
Id. at 562.
3. Not only the holding but also the language of Lawrence preserved the dignity of
homosexual persons. In the 1986 decision upholding the statute, the Court saw
"[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation, on the one hand, and
homosexual activity on the other." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
In Lawrence, the Court explicitly recognized the connection between family, mar-
riage, or procreation, and the intimate acts of homosexual and heterosexual peo-
ple: "Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
4. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
5. Id. at 578.
6. Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
7. Id. at 567.
8. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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and unusual punishment. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, re-
called the language of Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles9 in
describing the dictates of the Eighth Amendment: "The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man .... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."1O
The Court held that executing a mentally retarded defendant violates
the prohibition in view of existing standards of decency."
In March 2005, the Supreme Court decided the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits a state from executing a seventeen year old offender
for a capital crime. 12 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted
that the Eighth Amendment applies to the death penalty "with special
force"13 and protects "even those convicted of heinous crimes."14 The
Court analyzed the constitutionality of these executions in light of
evolving standards of decency, describing "objective indicia" of the con-
sensus that juvenile offenders are less culpable than their adult coun-
terparts. 15 Based on this consensus, the Court concluded the death
penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders.
In an earlier Eighth Amendment case, Hope v. Pelzer,16 the Court
considered whether an Alabama prison's treatment of inmate Larry
Hope-specifically, tying him to a hitching post in the sun with little
water and no opportunity to go to the bathroom for seven hours-vio-
lated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The
Court held it did, repeatedly referring to the assault on Pope's dignity.
Justice Stevens described the treatment as "antithetical to human
dignity-he was hitched to a post for an extended period of time in a
position that was painful, and under circumstances that were both de-
grading and dangerous."'7 The Court held the Eighth Amendment
prohibited the unnecessarily cruel and demeaning treatment.' 8
9. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
10. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01).
11. Id. at 321.
12. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
13. Id. at 1194 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
14. Id. at 1190. Justice Kennedy described the Eighth Amendment as reaffirming
the "duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons." Id.
15. Id. at 1194. In explaining that juvenile offenders are less culpable, the Court
referred to juvenile offenders as more deserving of forgiveness for failing to es-
cape the negative forces in their environment than their older counterparts. Id.
at 1195.
16. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). This case was heard and decided during the same term as
Atkins.
17. Id. at 745.
18. The Court emphasized the lack of necessity of the punishment: "This punitive
treatment amounts to gratuitous infliction of 'wanton and unnecessary' pain that
our precedent clearly prohibits." Id. at 738. "This wanton treatment was not
done of necessity, but as punishment for prior conduct." Id. at 745.
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As in Hope, the Court in Lawrence held unconstitutional a statute
that demeaned homosexual persons by regulating their private, con-
sensual conduct. The Eighth Amendment, based on the concept of
human dignity, also prevented Virginia from executing a mentally re-
tarded defendant. Recent Supreme Court decisions are replete with
language and outcomes advancing human dignity.
More than twenty-five years before Lawrence, the Court, in Gregg
v. Georgia,19 analyzed whether the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Jus-
tice Stewart, writing for the Court, cited Trop for the notion that
human dignity underlies the Eighth Amendment. 2 0 Yet, the Court
held the punishment did not violate the Eighth Amendment, as the
punishment was not meted out arbitrarily, 2 1 and the societal purposes
of the statute, retribution and deterrence, outweighed the competing
human dignity concerns. 22
This Article examines whether, in view of our "evolved" standard of
decency and the Lawrence Court's express recognition of human dig-
nity as a value underlying the petitioner's constitutional rights,
human dignity plays a substantial role in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion-making. This Article does not advocate establishing dignity as a
new right or value, like the "penumbra" idea of Justice Douglas in
Griswold v. Connecticut,23 but rather shows that the Court has re-
peatedly treated human dignity as a value underlying, or giving
meaning to, existing constitutional rights and guarantees.
Part II of this Article defines human dignity as a constitutional
value. This Part begins with definitions to provide a common under-
standing of what human dignity means. Next, the Article addresses
whether the Court treats human dignity, so defined, as a constitu-
tional value. The Article contends human dignity, as defined herein,
is a core value underlying express and un-enumerated constitutional
rights and guarantees.
19. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
20. Id. at 173 (plurality opinion).
21. Id. at 206.
22. The Gregg Court acknowledged it must balance the state objectives against
human dignity: "As we have seen, however, the Eighth Amendment demands
more than that a challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society.
The Court must also ask whether it comports with the basic concept of human
dignity at the core of the Amendment." Id. at 182. The Court described the two
"principal societal purposes" as retribution and deterrence. Id. at 183. Although
not a principle purpose, incapacitating the dangerous criminal is another pur-
pose. Id. at 183 n.28. Deterrence is presumably the dominant objective, as the
Court stated that retribution is no longer the dominant goal. Id. at 183 (citing
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)).
23. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees.").
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In Part III, after a brief history of human dignity in American con-
stitutional jurisprudence, the Article analyzes cases in which human
dignity has trumped over competing concerns, and cases in which
competing concerns have prevailed over human dignity. This Part
demonstrates inconsistences in the Court's reliance on human dignity
as the foundation of certain rights and guarantees.
After setting forth these inconsistencies, Part IV recommends the
Court consistently and expressly rely on human dignity when apply-
ing constitutional tests and standards. Part IV illustrates how these
tests should apply with human dignity serving as an underlying
precept.
Much has been written about the role of human dignity in other
nations' constitutional jurisprudence 24 and legal systems. 25 My focus
is on the role human dignity plays in only American jurisprudence
under the United States Constitution. Again, this Article does not es-
pouse creating a new right (i.e., the right to have one's human dignity
preserved). Rather, the Article shows that the Court has recognized
human dignity as that which gives meaning to existing rights. The
Court should now establish a means of consistently applying human
dignity as an underlying value.
II. WHAT IS HUMAN DIGNITY AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE?
To some, human dignity is "the premier value underlying the last
two centuries of moral and political thought."26 During the War in
24. See, e.g., Edward Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German
and American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 968-72 (1997) (argu-
ing that all of the fundamental rights under German Law-liberty, equality, free-
dom of faith, conscience, and creed, freedom of expression, assembly, and
property-are subject to change by constitutional amendment, except for human
dignity). Article 1 of the German Basic Law emphasizes the role of human dig-
nity: "Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all
state authority." GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.).
25. See, e.g., Izhak Englard, Uri and Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture: Human Dig-
nity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1903, 1925 (2000). Englard, Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of
Israel and Law Professor at Hebrew University, describes the ambit of the term
"human dignity" within Israel's "Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty" en-
acted in 1992. Section 1A of the Basic Law reads: "The purpose of this Basic Law
is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to anchor in a Basic Law the
values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state." Id. (citing The
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391). According to Englard,
"the Israeli Supreme Court has derived from the Basic Law's notion of dignity the
protection of some additional human rights, such as freedom of expression, free-
dom of religion and of conscience, and freedom of contract." Id. at 1926.
26. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Pen-
alty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES
145-46 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992). Bedau, at the time
[Vol. 84:740
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Iraq,2 7 human dignity has been in the forefront of the public's eye and
mind. Abu Ghraib prison raised the specter of our country humiliat-
ing and torturing prisoners of war. The news media highlighted the
indignity suffered by male prisoners at being made to undress and
perform sexual acts in front of female officers. 28 The American public
recoiled at the clear assault on these prisoners' dignity.2 9
Sixty years before these events, Swedish sociologist Gunner Myr-
dal referred to human dignity as a defining American principle. 30
Myrdal described the American Creed 3 l as including dignity as an es-
sential ideal: "These ideals of the essential dignity of the individual
human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain
inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and a fair opportunity represent
to the American people the essential meaning of the nation's early
struggle for independence."3 2
In recent times, American leaders have repeatedly touted human
dignity as an American value. In his first State of the Union Address,
his article was published, was Austin Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts
University.
27. On March 19, 2003, President George W. Bush announced the beginning of
armed conflict against Iraq. Bush declares war, CNN, Mar. 19, 2003, http://www.
cnn.com/2003/US/03/19/sprj.irq.int.bush.transcript/index.html. The war is com-
monly referred to as the 'War in Iraq."
28. Caryle Murphy, Grappling with the Morals on Display in Abu Ghraib, WASH.
POST, May 29, 2004, at B09 ("Bishops of the United Methodist Church also ad-
dressed the prisoner abuse in a statement, saying that 'the cycle of violence in
which the United States is engaged has created a context for the denigration of
human dignity and gross violations of human rights of Iraqi prisoners of war.'");
David R. Sands, ICC Seen as 'Forum' for Hits on U.S., Allies, WASH. TIMES, May
18, 2004, at A01 ("The reality of torture and systematic abuses of the dignity of
Iraqi prisoners, sometimes followed by murders, both by U.S. and British troops,
is no longer in question. . . ."); Countdown (MSNBC television broadcast May 12,
2004) ("[I]n the moments before they killed Nicholas Berg, one [sic] the masked
men in the video said that they were avenging the, quote, 'satanic degradation of
Iraqi prisoners ... the dignity of the Muslim men and women in Abu Ghraib and
others is not redeemed except by blood and souls."').
29. According to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, seventy-three percent of Ameri-
cans said the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison was unjustified
under any circumstances. Poll: 73 percent say Iraqi abuse unjustified, CNN, May
10, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/05/10/poll.iraq.abuse/index.
html. "71% [of Americans] said the mistreatment should be considered a serious
offense rather than a harmless prank." Id. At the time of the poll, support for the
war was at its lowest point since the war began. Id. Similarly, Bush's overall
approval rating was at its lowest in his presidency. Id.
30. GUNNER MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DE-
MOCRACY 4 (2d ed. 1944). The Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483, 495 n.1 1 (1954), cited An American Dilemma as authority for the notion that
segregation negatively impacts African-American school children.
31. Myrdal refers to the American Creed as a pattern of ideals providing a standard
by which a democracy can be judged. See MYRDAL, supra note 30, at 23.
32. Id. at 4.
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President George W. Bush referred to "the non-negotiable demands of
human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; re-
spect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and re-
ligious tolerance."3 3 In a 2003 radio address after President Bush's
week long visit to Africa, President Bush stated: "The United States
is committed to the success of Africa, because the peoples of Africa
deserve to live in freedom and dignity, and to share in the progress of
our times."3 4 And when welcoming Sikh leaders to the White House,
the President assured, "our common commitment to make sure that
every American is treated with respect and dignity."35
This American commitment to protecting and advancing human
dignity enjoys non-partisan support. President William J. Clinton, in
a radio address in June 2000, reiterated our "responsibility" to assist
"our older Americans live out their lives with quality and in dignity."36
During Black History Month, as President Clinton described the con-
tributions of the second squadron of African-American fighter pilots
in Tuskegee, Alabama, Clinton referred to human dignity as a core
American value: "Their belief in an America that would respect their
courage and honor their service is the foundation of the America we
all want to live in, one where every person is treated with dignity and
respect and all of our children have the chance to live their dreams."3 7
Whether advancing human dignity38 is a meaningful value in
American constitutional jurisprudence is the subject of this Article.
Asked differently, when the Court states that human dignity under-
lies the Eighth Amendment 39 and that the "overriding" function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect human dignity,40 is the Court touting
empty slogans? Do human dignity concerns govern the Court's consti-
tutional decision-making? And, if the Constitution protects human
33. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html.
34. President George W. Bush, President's Radio Address (July 12, 2003), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030712-1.html.
35. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Meeting with Sikh Com-
munity Leaders The Roosevelt Room (Sept. 26, 2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010926-1.html.
36. President William J. Clinton, President's Radio Address (June 24, 2000), availa-
ble at http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=016142
3397+32+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve.
37. President William J. Clinton, President's Radio Address (Feb. 19, 2000), availa-
ble at http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=016142
3397+38+1+0&WAISaction-retrieve.
38. As discussed in Part II, dignity is defined as a human attribute. The constitu-
tional value is thus "protecting or advancing human dignity." At times, this Arti-
cle will refer to human dignity as a constitutional value. However, the more
precise question is whether the Constitution protects or advances human dignity
as a core value.
39. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
40. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
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dignity, what does the value mean-what exactly is the Constitution
protecting?
According to some, the Supreme Court has "changed the content of
U.S. constitutional law to name dignity as a distinct and core value."41
Dignity is an "increasingly vital and vibrant constitutional precept."4 2
William A. Parent, in opining that human dignity "enjoys constitu-
tional protection," points to both Ronald Dworkin and Justice Bren-
nan as having "endorsed the idea that dignity is the fundamental
value underlying the U.S. Constitution."43 The Court itself has re-
ferred to a "constitutional guarantee" of human dignity. 44
Others commentators believe the Court has not recognized human
dignity as a constitutional value.45 James Q. Whitman in his 2004
article contrasting the notions of privacy in American and European
constitutional jurisprudence describes privacy protections in France
and Germany as "at their core, a form of protection of a right to respect
and personal dignity."46 America, according to Whitman, "is much
more oriented toward values of liberty, and especially liberty against
the state."4 7 Accordingly, human dignity lacks meaning as a constitu-
tional value.4 8 Another commentator describes the role of human dig-
nity in our constitutional jurisprudence as "episodic and
underdeveloped."49
41. Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role
of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1941 (2003).
These commentators contend the Supreme Court has "embedded the term dignity
into the U.S. Constitution." Id. at 1926.
42. Jordan Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially
Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 148 (1984).
43. William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITU-
TION OF RIGHTS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 26, at 47.
44. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (describing the "right to live in
human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights");
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 135 (1945) (stating that a citizen "was enti-
tled to all the respect and fair treatment that befits the dignity of a man, a dig-
nity that is recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution").
45. Jeremy Rabkin, Law and Human Dignity: What We Can Learn About Human
Dignity From International Law, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 145, 146 ("The
Founders embraced this more limited conception of international law because
they understood that human dignity was not something that could be assured by
government, let alone by international understandings.").
46. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 Yale L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 1214 ("There is language about respect in Lawrence, but there is little
that can be said to count in any certain way as law."). Ultimately, Whitman con-
cludes that protecting human dignity is "quite alien to the American tradition."
Id. at 1221.
49. Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transna-
tional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 17 (2004).
20061
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This Article does not address the Founding Fathers' intentions5 0 or
the legitimacy from a constitutional law standpoint of the Court inter-
preting the Constitution to include human dignity as a value. Instead,
this Article demonstrates that from the mid-1940s to the present, the
Court has treated human dignity as a constitutional value. In some
instances, the Court has decided cases based on the notion that
human dignity underlies express and un-enumerated constitutional
guarantees; only by advancing human dignity do these Courts' deci-
sions fulfill a particular constitutional right or guarantee. In other
cases, while acknowledging human dignity concerns, the Court has
failed to heed these concerns in light of competing interests. Ulti-
mately, this Article disagrees with both sides of the existing litera-
ture, as human dignity is a well-developed and robust core value but
only in certain types of cases, typically those where public opinion fa-
vors advancing human dignity interests above competing state
interests. 51
Immanuel Kant is generally thought responsible for our under-
standing of human dignity.5 2 Though he was not the first to use the
term, Kant added "a new, important dimension to the notion of human
50. Scholars differ on how to ask the relevant questions. Many ask whether the
Founding Fathers intended dignity to serve as a value underlying the Constitu-
tion. Jeremy Rabkin notes how the international law concept of human dignity
differs from the notion of our Founding Fathers. See Rabkin, supra note 45, at
146. William Parent suggests that the Founding Fathers endorsed the concept of
human dignity as a constitutional value. See Parent, supra note 43, at 69 (noting
that Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, stated: "[Yes, my country-
men, I own to you, that, that after having given in my attentive consideration, I
am clearly of the opinion, it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced, that this
is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness."). Louis
Henkin opines that the Founding Fathers conceived human dignity as tied to
rights:
Individual rights are the basic, irreducible, political conception and po-
litical 'good.' But if the Framers did not derive rights from dignity, the
political theory that made rights the 'atomic' good reflected a conception
of the human being as worthy, has having essential dignity; the source of
the individual's rights give evidence to his (her) dignity; the rights that
the individual has speak to his (her) dignity.
Louis Henkin, Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS, HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 26, at 213).
51. This Article is not about the role public opinion plays in the Court's decision-
making regarding human dignity. For a discussion of that issue, see James G.
Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation, 1993 BYU L.
REV. 1037 (1993). Rather, this Article describes how differently the Court treats
human dignity in different categories of cases and posits the Court should treat
human dignity as a constant value, regardless of the type of case and despite
popular opinion supporting a competing interest.
52. Bedau, supra note 26, at 152 (positing that the concept of human dignity "ab-
ruptly comes on stage in moral theory two centuries ago in the philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant").
HUMAN DIGNITY
dignity."53 Kant defined dignity as "a quality of intrinsic, absolute
value, above any price, and thus excluding any equivalence." 54 Kant
contrasted human dignity from (with) something having a price.
Something with a price can be substituted for or replaced by some-
thing else of equal value. Value signifies the worth of the thing rela-
tive to a person's desires. Dignity, in contrast to something with a
price, cannot be replaced by anything else, and it is not relative to
anyone's desires.5 5
Kant's "categorical imperative" or "formula of ends" required that
people "[a]ct in such a way that you treat humanity, both in your per-
son and in the person of each other individual, always at the same
time as an end, never as a mere means."5 6
Adam Bedau described Kant's view of human dignity as a series of
interrelated attributes. 57 First, Bedau reiterated the Kantian view
that "referring to a person's dignity is another way of referring to a
person's worth."58 Second, Kant considered that men and women pos-
sessed this worth equally: "[Persons vary from one to another and
from situation to situation in their merit, value, and usefulness....
Their dignity or worth is a kind of value that all human beings have
equally and essentially."59 "Hence human worth or dignity is invaria-
bly described as 'intrinsic' or 'inherent,' to contrast it with value that
is instrumental, contingent, extrinsic, or circumstantial."60 Next,
human dignity arises from our autonomy and rationality. "[Hiuman
dignity is intimately related to human autonomy. An autonomous
creature is a self-activating, self-directing, self-criticizing, self-cor-
recting, self-understanding creature."61 Fourth, "our dignity is in-
separably connected to our self-conscious rationality, our capacities to
evaluate, calculate, organize, predict, explain, conjecture, justify and
53. Englard, supra note 25, at 1918.
54. Id.
55. Alan Gewirth, Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS,
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 26, at 10, 13.
56. Englard, supra note 25, at 1918-20.
57. Bedau, supra note 26, at 153-56.
58. Id. at 153. "Dignity" is defined as "[tihe quality of being worthy or honourable;
true worth, excellence." 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 671
(1993). "Dignified" means "showing or expressing dignity." Id. For this Article,
dignity is used to mean "the quality of being worthy" or "worth" rather than no-
bleness or excellence. The term "human dignity" is at times used interchangea-
bly with "dignity" to describe a quality human beings, rather than states or
causes of action, possess.
59. Bedau, supra note 26, at 153.
60. Id. at 154.
61. Id.
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so forth."62 Finally, "human dignity provides the basis for equal
human rights."63
International legal texts adopt this concept of human dignity, con-
necting human dignity to the provision of human rights. Both the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights proclaim the equal dignity of all men and women. The first
line of the Declaration's Preamble recognizes "the inherent dignity
and.., the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family."64 Article one of the Declaration states: "All human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood."65
These proclamations, arising out of the horrors of fascism and Na-
ziism during World War 11,66 were aimed at protecting all men and
women against humiliation by the state and at ensuring their equal
access to human rights.6 7 Dignity and rights, though separate, are
interwoven in both the United Nations Charter and Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. Dignity is "the tuning fork" or key according
to which rights are harmonized; human dignity is the "ultimate value"
that gives coherence to human rights.68 As implied in the Preamble,
"human rights somehow follow from human dignity and human dig-
nity follows from human rationality and conscience. Something about
human intellect and conscience creates a duty to treat people in a cer-
tain way: in a spirit of brotherhood."69 According to Mary Ann Glen-
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 12, 1948). The Preamble goes on to describe the inherent dignity and equal
rights of all members of the human family as "the foundation of freedom, justice
and peace in the world." Id.
65. Id. at 72.
66. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNI-
VERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS xv-xvi (2001); Resnik & Chi-hye Suk,
supra note 41, at 1932.
67. Commentators explain the introduction of the term dignity as a result of World
War II, "when legal and political commentary around the world turned to the
term dignity to identify rights of personhood .... [D]ignity talk in the law of the
United States is an example of how U.S. law is influenced by the norms of other
nations, by transnational experiences, and by international legal documents."
Resnik & Chi-hye Suk, supra note 41, at 1926.
68. Mary Ann Glendon, Procter Honoria Respectful: Knowing the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1172 (1998) (stating human
dignity is the "obvious candidate" for the Declaration's ultimate value: "[D]ignity
enjoys pride of place in the Declaration: it is affirmed ahead of rights at the very
beginning of the Preamble; it is accorded priority again in Article 1; and it is
woven into the text at three key points. . . ."); Kevin J. Hanson, Religious Liberty
and Human Dignity: A Tale of Two Declarations, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 81,
84 (2003).
69. Hanson, supra note 68, at 84.
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don, Rene' Cassin 7o viewed the Declaration as the portico of a temple.
"The general principles of dignity, liberty, equality and fraternity, pro-
claimed in Articles 1 and 2, are the portico's four foundation blocks."71
Thus, human dignity is the "ultimate value" in these international le-
gal texts.72
William A. Parent 73 adds one final and essential dimension to our
emerging notion of human dignity as a constitutional value. Parent
posits that human dignity is "constituted by a particular, especially
important moral right."74 Parent defines moral dignity as a "negative
moral right not to be regarded or treated with unjust personal dispar-
agement" and "not to be subject to or victimized by unjust attitudes or
acts of contempt."75 Human dignity provides each of us equal moral
standing under the law: "It furnishes each one of us, whether strong
or weak, politically powerful or disenfranchised, competent or re-
tarded, and whatever our race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation,
with an indefeasible moral standing to protest (or to have protested on
our behalf) all insidious attempts to degrade our persons."76
Thus, moral dignity gives each of us equal standing against arbi-
trary government action that demeans, humiliates, and degrades.
Parent believes human dignity enjoys constitutional protection flow-
ing from the Due Process Clause. "To have moral dignity is to possess
the right not to be arbitrarily and therefore unjustly disparaged as a
person."7 7 Our constitutional rights, including our rights to privacy,
liberty, and protection against unreasonable search and seizure, stem
from our human dignity.
Drawing from the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and William
Parent, and from the United Nations Charter and Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, protecting or advancing human dignity as a
70. Rene' Cassin, General Charles de Gaulle's principal legal advisor during World
War II, was the French delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights. Glendon describes Cassin as one of the most distinguished jurists of the
twentieth century. Glendon, supra note 68, at 1158.
71. Id. at 1163.
72. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (called "Common Article 3" because
it is common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions) provides that in the case
of armed conflict, each Party to the conflict will apply certain provisions. These
provisions include that persons taking no active part in the hostilities will be
treated humanely. Specifically, "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment," are prohibited "at any time and in any
place whatsoever." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
son in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 973, 288-90.
73. William A. Parent is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Santa Clara Univer-
sity. Much of my understanding of human dignity as a value comes from his
article Constitutional Values and Human Dignity. See Parent, supra note 43.
74. Id. at 48.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 66.
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constitutional value means protecting the moral status of every man
and woman-a status which allows each person equal access to legal
rights and equal protection against state action that demeans, humili-
ates, or offends. Unlike a notion of human dignity that involves only
how the public perceives an individual, this notion of human dignity
also concerns how the state treats an individual.
Before finalizing our definition of human dignity, we must also ex-
amine James Q. Whitman's notion of human dignity, which differs
from the Court's usual conception of the term.78 Whitman compares
European and American notions of privacy and concludes that the
American notion of privacy is not grounded in a concern for human
dignity. 79 According to Whitman, the American notion of privacy is
more akin to a liberty interest8 O while the European notion is closer to
a concern for dignity. Whitman defines the European concept of pri-
vacy as a right to one's image, name, and reputation:
Continental privacy protections are, at their core, a form of protection of a
right to respect and personal dignity. The core continental privacy rights are
rights to one's image, name, and reputation, and what Germans call the right
to informational self-determination-the right to control the sorts of informa-
tion disclosed about oneself. These are closely linked forms of the same basic
right: They are all rights to control your public image-rights to guarantee
that people see you the way you want to be seen. They are, as it were, rights
to be shielded against unwanted public exposure-to be spared embarrass-
ment or humiliation.8 1
Whitman concludes that "protecting people's dignity is quite alien to
the American tradition."82 American constitutional jurisprudence
does not, according to Whitman, "endorse the general norm of per-
sonal dignity found in Europe."8 3
While I agree that our constitutional notion of privacy differs from
the European notion of privacy as a right to control one's public image,
I disagree that American constitutional jurisprudence fails to protect
human dignity. Human dignity under the United States Constitution
subsumes that which Whitman describes. The cases cited herein
demonstrate that the Court has, at times, been guided in its decision-
making by concerns for individuals' sense of self-worth and self-re-
spect (i.e., ensuring the state does not treat individuals in a way that
78. To avoid confusing the various notions of human dignity, I first want to discard a
common meaning of human dignity that arises when comparing American juris-
prudence to European notions of human dignity. This alternative notion of dig-
nity will come into play later in the Article.
79. Whitman, supra note 46, at 1161.
80. Whitman describes this liberty interest as protecting against the state:
"America, in this as in so many things, is much more oriented toward values of
liberty, and especially liberty against the state.... It is the right to freedom from
intrusions by the state, especially in one's own home." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1221.
83. Id.
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arbitrarily or unnecessarily offends or demeans them as well as pro-
tecting an individual's reputation). In Brown v. Board of Education,84
for example, often described as motivated by the Court's interest in
protecting the human dignity of black school children,8 5 the Court did
not seek to merely advance the "public image" and reputational inter-
est of the children. Rather the Court sought to protect the children
from feeling inferior and discouraged at having to attend a separate,
inferior school. Thus, the concept of human dignity in Brown has as-
pects other than just the notion of reputational self-interest. As
shown, human dignity for purposes of this Article concerns how the
state treats an individual as well as how the state or public perceives
an individual.
At times these human dignity concerns are deeply personal and at
times they are not: a married couple's decision regarding contracep-
tion; an employee's protection against overly intrusive drug testing; a
woman's ability to choose whether to abort a fetus; a prisoner's right
to protection against unnecessarily demeaning punishment; and a
person's ability to engage in consensual intimate acts with a partner.
As demonstrated herein, human dignity, so conceived, underlies our
constitutional rights to privacy, liberty, protection against unreasona-
ble search and seizure, protection against cruel and unusual punish-
ment, and other express rights and guarantees.
III. DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE
A. Background
Justice Frank MurphyS6 used the term "dignity" in his dissent
from the 1944 case of Korematsu v. United States.8 7 In that case,
Korematsu was convicted of remaining in a designated military area
(Korematsu's residence was in San Leandro, California, one of the ar-
eas from where all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded) in vio-
84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
85. See Parent, supra note 43, at 59; Paust, supra note 42, at 172.
86. Justice Murphy was considered a "civil libertarian." During his tenure on the
Court from February 5, 1940 until July 19, 1949, he wrote 217 opinions, about
seventy of which involved civil liberties. HAROLD NORRIS, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1, 3 (1965).
87. 323 U.S. 214, 240 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter actually
used the term "dignity" regarding constitutional jurisprudence in the early 1940s.
In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), the defendant alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel because the court appointed defendant's counsel to also re-
present a co-defendant. Justice Frankfurter stated: "Whether [the Bill of Rights]
safeguards of liberty and dignity have been infringed in a particular case depends
upon the particular circumstances." Id. at 87 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). How-
ever, Justice Murphy was the first to use phrases such as "dignity of man,"
"human dignity," and "dignity of the individual." See Paust, supra note 42, at
154.
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lation of the military requirement that persons of Japanese ancestry
be excluded from that area.8 8 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Black, upheld the exclusion program based on military necessity. Jus-
tice Black stated the Court "could not reject the finding of the military
authorities" that the exclusion was necessary.8 9
In opposing the race-based classification, Justice Murphy stated as
follows:
To give constitutional sanction to that inference 9 0 in this case, however well-
intentioned may have been the military command on the Pacific Coast, is to
adopt one of the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy the
dignity of the individual and to encourage and open the door to discriminatory
actions against other minority groups in the passions of tomorrow. 9 1
Justice Murphy described the military orders as falling "into the ugly
abyss of racism" 92 and as going beyond the brink of constitutional
power.9 3
Two years later in Yamashita v. Styer,94 Tomoyuki Yamashita, a
general of the Japanese army who was convicted by a military com-
mission of violating laws of war, sought a writ of habeas corpus chal-
lenging the jurisdiction and legal authority of the military commission
which convicted him.95 The Court denied the petition for certiorari.
88. Justice Murphy was criticized for his concurrence in Hirabayahsi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), in which the Court sustained Hirabayashi's conviction
for violating a military curfew order. Justice Murphy described the holding as a
breach of personal liberty: "Today is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we
have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of citizens of the
United States based on the accident of race or ancestry." Id. at 111 (Murphy, J.,
concurring). While not using the term dignity, Justice Murphy stated that
"[tiheir status of citizens .. should at all times be accorded the fullest considera-
tion and respect." Id. at 113-14.
89. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219.
90. The inference is that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty. Id.
at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 233.
93. Id. A year and a half before Korematsu, in Hirabayashi the Court affirmed Hira-
bayashi's conviction for violating a curfew order imposed by the military com-
mander. The order required that all persons of Japanese ancestry residing in
certain areas be within their place of residence daily between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00
a.m. Justice Murphy concurred in Hirabayashi. In Hirabayashi, Justice Murphy
compared the American government's military order to how the Nazis treated the
Jews living in Germany. "The result is the creation in this country of two classes
of citizens for the purposes of a critical and perilous hour-to sanction discrimi-
nation between groups of United States citizens on the basis of ancestry." Hira-
bayashi, 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring).
94. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
95. According to Justice Murphy's account, despite the absence of military necessity,
"petitioner was rushed to trial under an improper charge, given insufficient time
to prepare an adequate defense, deprived of the benefits of some of the most ele-
mentary rules of evidence and summarily sentenced to be hanged." Id. at 27-28
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
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In his dissent, Justice Murphy again called forth the notion of dignity,
this time "human dignity," stating: "If we are ever to develop an or-
derly international community based upon a recognition of human
dignity, it is of the utmost importance that the necessary punishment
of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the ugly stigma
of revenge and vindictiveness."9 6 Justice Murphy ended his lengthy
dissent with another reference to dignity: "While peoples in other
lands may not share our beliefs as to due process and the dignity of
the individual, we are not free to give effect to our emotions in reckless
disregard of the rights of others."9 7
Justice Robert H. Jackson, Justice Murphy's contemporary, also
referred to human or individual dignity in constitutional jurispru-
dence during the mid-1940s and early 1950s. 98 In a case involving a
petitioner's unreasonable search and seizure claim based on an alleg-
edly illegal search of petitioner's apartment, Justice Jackson wrote
this dramatic dissent: "[T]he forefathers thought this was not too
great a price to pay for that decent privacy of home, papers and effects
which is indispensable to individual dignity and self respect. They
may have overvalued privacy, but I am not disposed to set their com-
mand at naught."9 9 In another case of constitutional interpretation,
Justice Jackson described arrest and detention, of any length, as "in-
dignities upon the person."100
More recently, prisoners alleging mistreatment by prison guards
have sought constitutional protection of their human dignity;l in
"right to die" lawsuits, patient advocates stress human dignity con-
cerns;1 0 2 in Bush v. Gore,1o3 the infamous voting rights case, the
Court referred to "the equal dignity owed to each voter;"1 0 4 and, in
96. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 41.
98. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing) ("[O]ne need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed
of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the human
personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes,
persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure
by police."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1946) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) ("There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority
may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality
and natural powers of a minority. .. ").
99. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 198 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
100. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
101. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
102. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 421 U.S. 702 (1997); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
103. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
104. Id. at 104 ("The right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental;
and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to
each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter."). This language comes from
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2004, the Court expressly advanced the human dignity of homosexual
men and women by striking down the Texas anti-sodomy statute.1 0 5
In his comprehensive study of the term "human dignity" in Su-
preme Court jurisprudence, Jordan Paust reported that from 1925
through 1982, the Supreme Court used the term human dignity or an
equivalent phrase in one hundred eighty-seven opinions (often in dis-
senting opinions).106 From 1980 until 2000, the Court included the
word dignity, as it relates to human dignity or individual dignity, in
ninety-one opinions (whether majority, concurring, or dissenting).o 7
Though the Court's use of the term dignity has increased (if you
average the number of times the Court used the term during each ten
year period), frequency of use does not necessarily indicate the Court's
increased reliance on the value. Often the term human dignity is used
in dissenting opinions.1 0 8 Presumably, the Court may also have relied
on human dignity concerns in its jurisprudence without actually using
the term human dignity.1o 9 In Brown, for example, the Court never
used the term human dignity but rather spoke of the demeaning effect
on African-American school children of requiring them to attend sepa-
rate schools from white children. As demonstrated herein, the Court's
use of the term and concept of human dignity is sporadic, depending
more on the type of case than the time period. 110
Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1972), in which Justice
Stevens stated in his dissenting opinion: "The members of each [ethnic, eco-
nomic, or social groups] go to the polls with equal dignity and with an equal right
to be protected from invidious discrimination." Id. at 852 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
105. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
106. Paust, supra note 42, at 158. By equivalent phrase, Paust means terms such as
"dignity of man," "dignity of the individual," and "personal dignity."
107. A LEXIS database search revealed 143 cases in which the Court used the term
"dignity" in an opinion. Often the term was used regarding the dignity of a state
or cause of action. A LEXIS database search revealed that from January 1, 2000
through October 15, 2005, the Court has used the term dignity, as it relates to the
dignity of persons, in twelve opinions.
108. Paust, supra note 42, at 160-62.
109. Presumably, judges seek to avoid having their language criticized by academics
and other judges and seek to build consensus through their language. As noted
herein, Justice Scalia in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, condemned the Court's description of rights as "central to
personal dignity and autonomy," as improper value judgments. Id. at 983
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Judge Posner criticized Justice Blackmun's writing style
as melodramatic and emotional. See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinion Writ-
ing: Judge's Writing Styles (And Do They Matter), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421,
1434-35, 1447 (1995). One commentator defended, as rational and well-rea-
soned, Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it" statement. Paul Gewirtz, On "I
Know It When I See It", 105 YALE L.J. 1023 (1996).
110. Looking at the cases by time periods or dates did not reveal any trends concern-
ing the Court's reliance on human dignity as a constitutional value. Lawrence
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B. Human Dignity as a Value Underlying Particular
Constitutional Claims
The Court has expressly linked human dignity to certain constitu-
tional claims, either by grounding the Court's decision in the need to
advance human dignity or by expressly rejecting human dignity con-
cerns in favor of competing state interests. These cases fall into ap-
proximately eight categories. While the Court may certainly mention
dignity concerns (not always expressed using the words human dig-
nity) in other cases,1 1 1 the categories of cases contain an express refer-
ence to the value of human dignity.
1. Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest, and corresponding right to pri-
vacy, regarding marriage, contraception, intimate acts, and procreation;
2. Fourteenth Amendment equal protection under the law regarding equal
access to education and accommodations;
3. Fifth Amendment protection against a person in a criminal case serving
as a witness against himself;
4. Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
5. Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment;
6. An individual's ability under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or
Equal Protection Clause to choose how and when to die when death is
imminent;
7. Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection right to economic
assistance from the government;
8. First Amendment freedom of expression and the opposing right of an indi-
vidual to protect his public image, as against another's First Amendment
freedom of speech.
In the first three categories of cases, the Court recognized human
dignity as a constitutional value and grounded its decision, at least in
part, on this recognition. In the next two types of cases, involving the
Fourth and Eighth Amendments, the Court's treatment of human dig-
nity of a value has been inconsistent and sporadic. These decisions
are inconsistent with the Court's strong rhetoric regarding human
dignity and sporadic in that the Court appeared to follow public opin-
ion and/or the executive branch's agenda in deciding the strength to
give human dignity as a value in its decision-making, rather than
treating dignity as invariant, an independent constitutional precept
that should be factored into its decision-making regardless of public
certainly marked a shift in the Court's openness concerning its reliance on the
value.
111. The voting rights opinions are surprisingly silent as to human dignity concerns.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) ("When the state legisla-
ture vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the
legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental na-
ture lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to
each voter."); Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 852 (7th Cir.
1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The members of each [ethnic, economic, or social
groups] go to the polls with equal dignity and with an equal right to be protected
from invidious discrimination.").
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opinion. In category 6 cases, which involve the right-to-die and physi-
cian assisted suicide, the Court acknowledged human dignity con-
cerns, yet determined that state interests outweighed these interests.
The seventh type of case does not involve state interference but
rather the state's unwillingness to interfere. 1 12 Thus, the petitioners
in these cases are not challenging state involvement but rather the
state's failure to provide economic assistance. These cases typically
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protec-
tion Clause; petitioners claim the state should waive an administra-
tive fee 1 3 or provide financial assistance equally."l 4 The nature of
the alleged injury differs in these cases, as, again, the state is not in-
terfering but rather failing to get involved. Human dignity has rou-
tinely failed to defeat competing state concerns in these cases.
The eighth type of case, involving the First Amendment, differs
from the others in three respects. First, this type of case presents two
competing constitutional claims: (i) freedom of expression under the
First Amendment and the human dignity flowing therefrom; and (ii)
the interest in preserving one's dignity-here reputation-against an-
other's right to speak publicly. The eighth category of cases demon-
strates that human dignity concerns can permeate opposing sides of a
constitutional issue. 1 15 The notion of human dignity as protecting
one's reputation is more akin to the dignity described by Whitman in
his article comparing the American and European concepts of pri-
vacy.1 16 Human dignity in the eighth type of case concerns both one's
public image and reputation as well as one's treatment by the state in
restraining or allowing speech. The eighth type of case involves con-
duct that demeans or humiliates as a result of private, rather than
state, action.117
112. Arguably, these cases involve state action if state action leads to an absence of
economic opportunity. There are two strands of welfare rights cases. First, deci-
sions like United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), and Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980), reflect the Court's Lochner-era assumption "that individuals pos-
sess economic options and are free to exercise them." Dennis D. Hirsch, The
Right to Economic Opportunity: Making Sense of the Supreme Court's Welfare
Rights Decisions, 58 U. Pirr. L. REV. 109, 130 (1996). Cases like Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), on the other hand, "share the New Deal assumption
that the poor are victims of external circumstances that constrain their economic
opportunities." Hirsch, supra, at 129. As an example, Hirsch notes that the
Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), assumed that poor people
had no employment opportunities to earn the money for the filing fee. Hirsch,
supra, at 129.
113. See Kras, 409 U.S. 434.
114. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
115. Certainly this can be said of the death penalty cases as well where the dignity of
society or the victim is at stake.
116. See Whitman, supra note 46.
117. Rather than the state interfering with relations between husband and wife and
thereby humiliating and degrading them, for example, these cases involve an in-
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The First Amendment cases show that advancing human dignity
also preserves our political system. As Justice Harlan stated in Cohen
v. California,1 1s our democratic government depends on our ability to
speak in opposition to or support of government action.
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove govern-
mental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope
that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and
more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests. 1 1 9
Advancing human dignity through freedom of expression thus creates
a more "capable citizenry and more perfect polity."120
Categorizing the cases as such shows that human dignity is, in cer-
tain types of cases, the strongest of constitutional values. In other cat-
egories of cases, and, more specifically, when the executive branch
and/or popular opinion support a competing state interest, human dig-
nity becomes frail. This Article posits that human dignity should have
independent standing as a value, factoring into the Court's decision-
making as that which underlies our constitutional guarantees and
holding that status even if public opinion or the executive branch sup-
ports a competing interest.
1. Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Interest and Corresponding
Right to Privacy Regarding Marriage, Contraception,
Intimate Acts, and Procreation
Human dignity is robust and well-developed in cases involving the
right to privacy regarding marriage, contraception, and procrea-
tion.121 The right to privacy in these cases flows from the liberty in-
terest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.122 In the early privacy cases, Griswold v. Connecti-
dividual or organization speaking out in a way that humiliates or degrades an-
other person.
118. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
119. Id. at 24 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. The Court often groups Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678
(1977), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), into cases involving "a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood." Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).
122. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (describing "penumbras" arising out of express
guarantees: "The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.").
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cut, 12 3 Carey v. Population Services International,124 and Eisenstadt
v. Baird,125 the Court spoke of the sacredness of marriage and of deci-
sions that are private, personal, and sensitive. In Roe v. Wade,126 the
Court held this right to privacy extended to a woman's right to choose
whether to have an abortion.127
In 1992, the Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey,128 revisited Roe in a case involving a Pennsylvania
statute requiring a woman to sign a statement indicating she had no-
tified her husband of her decision to abort and requiring that she re-
ceive certain information at least twenty-four hours before the
abortion. In the joint opinion, the Court described a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy as a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the
Court, central to this liberty are "choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy." 129
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, referred
to the personal nature of a woman's right to choose to have an abor-
tion. 130 "The authority to make such traumatic and yet empowering
decisions is an element of basic human dignity."131 Justice Stevens
connected human dignity to liberty as follows: "Part of the constitu-
123. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court first recognized the right to personal privacy in
Griswold. In Griswold, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, found a right
to privacy in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, made applicable to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut stat-
ute prohibiting the dispensing or use of birth control devices to or by married
couples. The Court relied on "penumbras" emanating from the specific guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights. The Court based its decision on the sanctity of the
marriage institution. "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage
is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred." Id. at 486.
124. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The Court again extolled personal privacy as a constitu-
tional right. The New York statute at issue prohibited the sale of contraceptives
to minors and prohibited advertisements or displays of contraceptives. Justice
Brennan relied on the right of personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. "This right of personal privacy includes 'the interest in indepen-
dence in making certain kinds of important decisions.'" Id. at 684 (citing Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). This right includes, but is not limited to, personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education. Id. at 685.
125. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
126. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
127. Id. at 152. In Roe, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, cited the 1891
decision of Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), as the first
time the Court recognized a constitutional right to privacy.
128. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
129. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 916 (emphasis added).
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tional liberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each of us is
entitled."13 2
Justice Scalia, in dissent, chastised the Court's reliance on the "un-
due burden" standard for deciding the constitutionality of the Penn-
sylvania abortion statute. The joint opinion's reference to the abortion
decision as "central to personal dignity and autonomy," was, according
to Justice Scalia, "a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a
value judgment and conceal a political choice."133
By criticizing the Court for a "value judgment," Justice Scalia high-
lighted that the Court did, in Planned Parenthood, rely on a "value"
for its decision-making. Arguably, however, preserving the dignity of
women by allowing them to make a deeply personal decision did not
reflect the Justices' personal value, though it may have coincided with
this value, but rather a value which underlies the Constitution. Jus-
tice Scalia himself relied on human dignity as a value underlying the
Constitution in a Fourth Amendment drug-testing case. 13 4 Planned
Parenthood differs from the earlier abortion decisions in that the
Court's decision-making was expressly informed by human dignity, as
part of a woman's liberty interest.
In another abortion decision, Stenberg v. Carhart,135 the Court, in
an opinion by Justice Breyer, again connected liberty to human dig-
nity. In Carhart, the Court struck down a Nebraska statute criminal-
izing partial birth abortions, stating, "[o]ther millions fear that a law
that forbids abortion would condemn many American women to lives
that lack dignity, depriving them of equal liberty."136
In the most recent privacy/liberty case, Lawrence v. Texas,13 7
human dignity played its most explicit role thus far in American con-
stitutional jurisprudence. 13s The Court in Lawrence again tied
human dignity to liberty in striking down the Texas anti-sodomy stat-
132. Id. at 920. In the next sentence of his opinion, Justice Stevens equates dignity
with respect: "A woman who decides to terminate her pregnancy is entitled to the
same respect as a woman who decides to carry the fetus to term." Id.
133. Id. at 983 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think it obvious that it is a type of search particularly
destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity."). Justice Scalia de-
scribed the drug tests at issue in Von Raab as "a kind of immolation of privacy
and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use." Id. at 681.
135. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
136. Id. at 920.
137. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
138. See Whitman, supra note 46, at 1162 ('This is notably true of Justice Kennedy,
whose opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas expresses admiration for Euro-
pean approaches, and who tries energetically to found his opinion on ideals of
both liberty and dignity."); see also Tobin A. Sparling, Lawrence v. Texas Sympo-
sium: Judicial Bias Claims of Homosexual Persons in the Wake of Lawrence v.
Texas, 46 S. TEx. L. REV. 255, 256 (2004).
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ute. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, spoke of dignity three
times. He noted the indignity of a conviction under the Texas law:
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. The of-
fense, to be sure, is but a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense in the Texas
legal system. Still, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the
dignity of the persons charged. The petitioners will bear on their record the
history of their criminal convictions. 1 3 9
In a similar vein, Justice Kennedy wrote that upholding Bowers v.
Hardwick]140 as law, "demeans the lives of homosexual persons."141 In
discussing the privacy interest at stake, Justice Kennedy wrote of dig-
nity as follows: "It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons." 142
Lawrence, to some, marked a shift from a privacy to a liberty inter-
est: "Lawrence may be taking a significant step toward subsuming the
textually questionable 'right of privacy' into a textually respectable
'right of liberty."'14 3 Yet, while Lawrence may mark a shift in how the
Justices referred to the right at stake, the decision marks a more sub-
stantial shift. Looking beneath what the Court called Lawrence's con-
stitutional claim, we find the Court advancing human dignity as part
of affording liberty.144 Thus, as in Planned Parenthood where dignity
was part of a woman's liberty interest, human dignity was part of the
liberty interest of the men and women whose constitutional rights
were impacted by the Texas anti-sodomy statute in Lawrence.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Under the Law
Regarding Access to Education and Accommodations
The Court again tied human dignity to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, this time the Equal Protection Clause, in Brown v. Board of
Education145 and subsequent cases involving discrimination in educa-
tion and accommodations. In Brown, the Court preserved the dignity
of black school children by striking down the "separate but equal" doc-
trine.14 6 Though the Court never used the term dignity, the Court
emphasized the demeaning impact on African-American children of
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (emphasis added).
140. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
141. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. 186).
142. Id. at 567.
143. James W. Paulsen, The Significance of Lawrence v. Texas, Hous. LAW., Feb.
2004, at 33, 38.
144. Both the outcome and the language of the opinion reflect the concern for human
dignity. See Sparling, supra note 138, at 256.
145. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing the "separate but equal"
doctrine).
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having to attend a separate school from their white counterparts.
"[F]or the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as de-
noting the inferiority of the negro group."14 7 The Court described the
impact on African-American children as follows: "To separate them
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the commu-
nity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone." 14s
The Court based its decision on the notion of a negative moral
right, the right to be free from the unnecessary humiliation and degra-
dation of a race-based classification.14 9 William Parent put it best:
[I]n these segregation cases members of our highest court displayed a genuine
concern for the value of human dignity. They many not have articulated their
opinions in the language of dignity, but their expressed outrage at the insidi-
ous government-sponsored disparagement of blacks is most clearly and per-
suasively formulated by direct appeal to this powerful concept. 15 0
Similarly, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,151 the
Court acted to preserve the dignity of African-Americans by striking
down racial discrimination in access to accommodations. The Court,
in an opinion by Justice Clark, upheld the constitutionality of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, twice reciting the legislative history of the
Act: "The Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the
fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate 'the deprivation of per-
sonal dignity that surely accompanies denials of public access to pub-
lic establishments." ' 15 2
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, as in Brown, the Court sought to elimi-
nate the indignity caused by racial discrimination. These opinions re-
flect a Court reacting to and seeking to rectify past indignities and
humiliations through its constitutional jurisprudence. 153 Both the
147. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
(1951)).
148. Id.
149. Some commentators have criticized Brown on grounds that a moral value gov-
erned the Court's decision. See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 562 (1988).
150. Parent, supra note 43, at 59.
151. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
152. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
153. In Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), a Fifteenth Amendment voting rights
case, the Court reiterated the connection between human dignity, the Constitu-
tion, and eliminating race-based classifications:
One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification
is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by
ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities. An
inquiry into ancestral lines is not consistent with respect based on the
unique personality each of us possesses, a respect the Constitution itself
secures in its concern for persons and citizens.
Id. at 517.
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language154 and outcome of Brown and Heart of Atlanta Motel demon-
strate the Court's concern for preserving human dignity as part of the
express equal protection guarantee.15 5
The Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,15 6 a case involving
gender discrimination, relied on Heart of Atlanta Motel to recall the
"stigmatizing injury" flowing from race discrimination. The Court
adopted the reasoning of Heart of Atlanta Motel, specifically noting
"the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of
equal access to public establishments."157 In upholding a statute
prohibiting gender discrimination, the Court stated that the "stigma-
tizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies
it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the
basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their
race."158
In Brown and Heart of Atlanta Motel, despite strong national se-
curity concerns regarding the repercussions of court-ordered school in-
tegration, 1 59  the Court ruled to advance the dignity of
African-American school children. Public opinion was certainly split
on this issue; the southern states vehemently opposed segregating the
schools, while northern states supported integrated schools.160 The
154. In Plessy, the Court's opinion, by Justice Brown, is replete with references to the
separateness of the "white and colored races" and the superiority of the white
race. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896). "It is claimed by the plaintiff
in error that, in any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the domi-
nant race, in this instance the white race, is property. . . ." Id. at 549 (emphasis
omitted). "If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane." Id. at 552 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Brown lacks any reference to the separateness of races or dominance
of one race.
155. See Parent, supra note 43, at 59 ("I choose, as my last case reflecting judicial
sensitivity to the kind of injustice constitutive of human dignity violations and as
such effectively protested by civil rights activists, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S."
"I am suggesting that in these segregation cases members of our highest court
displayed a genuine concern for the value of human dignity."); Resnik & Chi-hye
Suk, supra note 41, at 1936-37 (noting that the Court, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), "described discriminatory stereotyping of women as
denigrating an individual's dignity").
156. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
157. Id. at 625 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250).
158. Id.
159. Obviously, the Court was well aware of the potential racial tension and violence a
ruling in favor of desegregation would bring about. See Mark Tushnet & Katya
Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1867 (1991); James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1037 (1993).
160. These are generalities; yet, few would argue that Brown flowed from a public
outcry against segregated schools. Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in
Planned Parenthood, noted the absence of public opinion in the Brown decision:
"The rule of Brown is not tied to popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it
is a judgment that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segrega-
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Court ruled to desegregate, given the express need to halt the degra-
dation to black school children resulting from attending segregated
schools and despite grave national security concerns. In these cases,
human dignity retained its strength as a constitutional value, despite
competing public opinion.
3. Fifth Amendment Protection Against Self-Incrimination
The well-known Miranda v. Arizona1 6 ' decision is rooted in con-
cerns for the human dignity of the criminally accused. In Miranda,
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Warren, held that if an individual
is questioned while in custody, the privilege against self-incrimination
is jeopardized, and procedural safeguards must be in place to protect
the privilege. Justice Warren described the "interrogation environ-
ment" as serving no purpose other than to "subjugate the individual to
the will of his examiner."162 Though not physical intimidation, the
Court stated this environment is "equally destructive of human dig-
nity."163 After outlining the policies underlying the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Court concluded with this "overriding" thought:
"[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the re-
spect a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens."164
The dissenting Justices challenged the Court's focus on the human
dignity of the accused. "More than the human dignity of the accused
is involved; the human personality of others in the society must also
be preserved. Thus the values reflected by the privilege are not the
sole desideratum; society's interest in the general security is of equal
weight."16 5
In another Fifth Amendment case, the Court held that compelling
the target of a federal grand jury investigation to sign a form authoriz-
ing a foreign bank to provide account records did not violate the indi-
vidual's Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.166
Petitioner, the target of the investigation, invoked his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about bank
records from foreign banks. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Blackmun, reasoned the consent directive to the bank would not have
tion, no matter whether the public might come to believe that it is beneficial."
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 962 (1992)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
161. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
162. Id. at 457.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 460.
165. Id. at 537 (White, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices went on to say "it is
idle to talk about human dignity and civilized values" if the government cannot
provide for the security of the society. Id. at 539.
166. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
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testimonial significance; therefore, compelling an individual to sign
the consent directive would not violate the individual's Fifth Amend-
ment rights. 167 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens distin-
guished the forced production of physical evidence168 from intrusions
"upon the contents of the mind of the accused."169 Justice Stevens
called the forced intrusions into the mind of the accused "an even
greater violation of human dignity."170 Both the majority opinion and
the dissenting opinion talked at length about the principles underly-
ing the Fifth Amendment.171 According to Justice Stevens, the Fifth
Amendment privilege is satisfied "only when the person is guaranteed
the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in an unfettered
exercise of his own will."'172 Deviating from this principle, according
to Justice Stevens, "can only lead to mischievous abuse of the dignity
the Fifth Amendment commands the Government afford its
citizens."173
In United States v. Balysis,17 4 the Court held the privilege does not
apply to an individual who may be subject to criminal proceedings by
a foreign government. The dissenting Justices, linking human dignity
to the Fifth Amendment, described the privilege as follows:
This Court has often found, for example, that the privilege recognizes the un-
seemliness, the insult to human dignity, created when a person must convict
himself out of his own mouth .... The privilege can reflect this value, and
help protect against this indignity, even if other considerations produce only
partial protection-protection that can be overcome by other needs. 1 7 5
167. Id. at 219.
168. Justice Stevens cited cases including Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), in which the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a forced blood test, for
the notion the Court has condoned forced intrusions for physical evidence.
169. Doe, 487 U.S. at 219 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). One commentator described
the judicial philosophy of Justice Stevens as requiring the Court to protect indi-
vidual dignity: "Justice Stevens' practice ofjudicial restraint coexists with a deep
commitment to individual dignity values." William D. Popkin, A Common Law
Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1087, 1110 (1989). Popkin states that Justice Stevens' concept of the Fifth
Amendment is "explicitly linked to individual dignity." Id. at 1123.
170. Doe, 487 U.S. at 219 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, that the assertions
petitioner is forced to utter by executing the document are false, causes an even
greater violation of human dignity.").
171. Both opinions in Doe cited Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55
(1964), for the notion that "our respect for the inviolability of the human person-
ality" is one of the principles underlying the privilege. In the later case of United
States v. Balysis, 524 U.S. 666 (1998), the Court wrestled with the meaning of
this principle, which resembles the notion of "reputational interest" under Ger-
man constitutional law. The Court in Balysis essentially rejected the principle as
one underlying the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 691-94.
172. Doe, 487 U.S. at 219 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966)).
173. Id.
174. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
175. Id. at 713 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The Court disagreed, stating that fear of foreign prosecution is beyond
the scope of the privilege. 176
Since Miranda, which the Court affirmed as a "constitutional rule"
in 2000,177 human dignity has continued to play a role in the Court's
decision-making in the Fifth Amendment cases.
4. Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures
The Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment right of people
"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures," as protecting against physical in-
trusions of the home or domicile and against physical intrusions of the
body.178 In the Fourth Amendment cases, the Court acted to preserve
human dignity from the 1950s until the mid-1980s when the "War on
Drugs"179 gained notoriety. Then the Court, generally speaking, fol-
lowed the executive branch's lead180 in according the human dignity
of the accused in these cases little weight (if any) against the compet-
ing state interest in deterring and lessening drug trafficking within
our nation and at our borders.
In Rochin v. California,1 8 1 the well known "shocks the conscience"
decision, the Court held evidence was inadmissible when obtained by
the involuntary pumping of Rochin's stomach as part of a criminal in-
vestigation. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, de-
scribed the police conduct in securing evidence from the suspect as
"brutal" and "offensive to human dignity."'8 2 Justice Frankfurter de-
scribed the coerced confession as offending "even hardened sensibili-
ties." 18 3 Justice Frankfurter drew from what he believed to be
"canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples."184
176. Id. at 698 (majority opinion).
177. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
178. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1984).
179. In October of 1986, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
which appropriated $1.7 billion to fight the drug crisis. The bill created
mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses. Frontline, PBS, Thirty Years of
America's Drug War: a Chronology, http://www.pbs.orgwgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) [hereinafter PBS Frontline].
180. The drug "crack," a potent form of smokeable cocaine, gained public attention in
November 1985, when a New York Times cover story detailed the expanding use
of the drug in the New York region. Id.
181. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
182. Id. at 174.
183. Id. at 172 (referring to "the struggle to open [petitioner's] mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents").
184. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)).
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The Court reached the opposite result in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia,18 5 a case involving the mandatory testing of a criminally ac-
cused's blood for alcohol content. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, upheld the constitutionality of a blood test taken without
petitioner's consent. Petitioner was arrested at a hospital while being
treated for injuries from an automobile accident. A police officer di-
rected a physician at the hospital to take a blood sample to check peti-
tioner's alcohol level. The sample indicated intoxication, and the
report of the analysis was admitted into evidence. The Court held the
test chosen was reasonable, and the physician performed the test in a
reasonable manner, thus satisfying the Fourth Amendment.186
Despite ruling the state interests outweighed petitioner's Fourth
Amendment rights, Justice Brennan described the "overriding func-
tion of the Fourth Amendment [as] to protect personal privacy and
dignity against unwanted intrusion by the State."' 8 7 With regard to
"intrusions beyond the body's surface," Justice Brennan wrote that
"[t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained."188 The blood test passed
muster because the test chosen to measure blood-alcohol was reasona-
ble, the officer might reasonably have believed he had an emergency,
and the test was performed in a reasonable manner.1 8 9
More than thirty years after Schmerber and Rochin, in Winston v.
Lee,190 Justice Brennan again tied human dignity to the Fourth
Amendment. In Winston, the Court struck down as unconstitutional
forcing an individual to undergo a surgery to remove a bullet which
might then implicate the individual in a crime. The Court concluded
that the operation, which would go beneath the skin and require gen-
eral anesthesia, was a substantial intrusion not outweighed by state
interests in obtaining the evidence.1 9 1 The Court described "the ex-
tent of intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal
privacy and bodily integrity" as one factor for determining the reason-
ableness of the search.19 2 The Court cited Schmerber for the notion
that the overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to "protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State."193
185. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
186. The record revealed that the test was performed by a physician in a hospital us-
ing accepted medical practices. Id. at 770-72.
187. Id. at 767.
188. Id. at 769-70.
189. Id. at 770-72.
190. 470 U.S. 753 (1984).
191. Id. at 766.
192. Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 760.
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The Court became more likely to permit state-sanctioned bodily in-
trusions in the late 1980s, as the government's "War on Drugs" gained
increased media attention.194 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n,1 95 the Court affirmed the constitutionality under the
Fourth Amendment of mandatory blood and urine tests for railroad
employees under regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad
Administration. The Court held no warrants or reasonable suspicion
were required before the testing. According to the Court, in the bal-
ance, the government had a strong interest in obtaining the test re-
sults to ensure public safety; the employees had a diminished
expectation to privacy because the industry was highly regulated, and
the intrusiveness of the test was minimal.196
Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissenting in Skinner, noted the
indignity and humiliation suffered by employees at having the sample
taken. "Compelling a person to submit to the piercing of his skin by a
hypodermic needle so that his blood may be extracted significantly in-
trudes on the 'personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted in-
trusion by the State' against which the Fourth Amendment
protects."19 7 The dissenting Justices described urination as "among
the most private of activities," highlighting the humiliation at having
to do so with a monitor listening at the door.198
Justice Marshall likened the assault on personal dignity in Skin-
ner to the World War II relocation-camp and McCarthy-era cases in
terms of the denials of liberty in times of perceived necessity. 199 He
wrote of the danger of sacrificing "fundamental freedoms" in the name
of exigency: "History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come
in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant
to endure."200
194. According to PBS Frontline, Nancy Reagan's 1984 "Just Say No" anti-drug cam-
paign became "a centerpiece" of the Reagan administration's anti-drug campaign.
PBS Frontline, supra note 179. Crack cocaine became widespread in New York
in 1985. Id. In October 1986, President Reagan signed an omnibus drug bill,
appropriating $1.7 billion to fight the drug crisis. Id. The bill created mandatory
minimum penalties for drug offenses. Id.
195. 489 U.S. 602 (1988).
196. Id. at 627-33.
197. Id. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767 (1966)).
198. Id. at 645. The dissent quoted Charles Fried's statement that "excretory func-
tions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy, so much so that situations in
which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely distressing, as de-
tracting from one's dignity and self esteem." Id. at 646 (quoting Charles Fried,
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968)).
199. Id. at 635.
200. Id.
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Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,20
the Court upheld the constitutionality of drug testing of United States
customs officials employees directly involved in drug interdiction, re-
quired to carry a firearm, or who handled classified material. The pro-
gram required drug-testing by urinating in private with a monitor of
the same gender on hand to listen for the sound of urination. The
Court upheld the testing of employees directly involved in drug in-
terdiction or required to carry a firearm. The Court held the program
was not motivated by a perceived drug problem within the service but
rather by "the extraordinary safety and national security hazards that
would attend the promotion of drug users to positions that require the
carrying of firearms or the interdiction of controlled substances." 20 2
Justices Brennan, Scalia, Stevens, and Marshall dissented. Jus-
tice Scalia mentioned personal dignity three times in his dissenting
opinion. He described the drug testing as "particularly destructive of
privacy and offensive to personal dignity."20 3 "I decline to join the
Court's opinion in the present case because neither frequency of use
nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In my view the
Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human
dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use."20 4 Justice Scalia con-
cluded his dissent with a powerful statement regarding the role of
human dignity in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: "Those who lose
... are not just the Customs Service employees, whose dignity is thus
offended, but all of us-who suffer a coarsening of our national man-
ners that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its content .... "205
In the late 1980s, human dignity failed to prevail over competing gov-
ernment concerns in the Court's Fourth Amendment decisions regard-
ing employee drug testing.
Similarly, during this time, human dignity failed to govern the
Court's decision-making involving suspected drug trafficking at inter-
national borders and in homes.20 6 In Segura v. United States,20 7 de-
cided in 1984, petitioners challenged a suppression ruling on grounds
police made an illegal entry into their apartment. Specifically, the of-
ficers arrested Segura, an alleged drug trafficker, outside his apart-
ment building, then led him upstairs, entered the apartment without
201. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). The Court decided Von Raab and Skinner on the same day.
202. Id. at 674.
203. Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 681.
205. Id. at 687.
206. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding the exclusionary rule should be modified,
allowing for admission of evidence seized in good faith reliance on a search war-
rant, even if the search warrant was defective); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796 (1984).
207. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
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permission or consent, and made a cursory search, seeing drug para-
phernalia. The police left the "pre-warrant evidence" and took those
arrested (Segura and the others who were inside at the time the of-
ficers entered the apartment) to headquarters. Two Drug Task Force
agents remained in the apartment awaiting a warrant. Approxi-
mately twenty hours later, the officers obtained a search warrant and
conducted a thorough search of the apartment. The Court held the
seizure was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 20 8
The dissenting Justices described the agents' occupation of the
apartment as both an unreasonable "search" and an unreasonable
"seizure" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 20 9 Justice Stevens
ended the dissenting opinion with the language of Harris v. United
States2 10 linking human dignity to the Fourth Amendment: "The fore-
fathers thought this was not too great a price to pay [for the exclusion-
ary rule] for the decent privacy of home, papers and effects which is
indispensable to individual dignity and self-respect." 2 11
A year later in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,2 12 the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, upheld the conviction of de
Hernandez for federal narcotics offenses after she was arrested for
smuggling eighty-eight cocaine-filled balloons in her alimentary ca-
nal2 13 into the country. Customs officials at Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport detained de Hernandez for approximately sixteen hours
before seeking a court order for an x-ray and rectal examination. 214
Officials refused her request to make a phone call, and she refused to
go to the bathroom during her detention. Approximately twenty-four
hours after her flight had landed at the Los Angeles airport,2 15 a fed-
eral magistrate issued an order authorizing a rectal examination and
involuntary x-ray. De Hernandez was taken to a hospital where a
physician conducted a rectal examination and removed a balloon con-
taining cocaine. She was then placed under arrest.
208. Id. at 814-15.
209. Id. at 820-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Mar-
shall joined in Justice Stevens' dissent.
210. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
211. Segura, 468 U.S. at 839 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
213. Alimentary canal is defined as "the whole passage through the body, from mouth
to anus, by which food is received, digested, etc." 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 51 (1993).
214. The dissenting opinion stated she remained locked in the room for almost twenty-
four hours. She was formally placed under arrest "almost 27 hours after her ini-
tial detention." Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted).
215. The dissenting opinion explained that not until sixteen hours had passed did the
supervisor seek a magistrate's order. Another eight hours passed before the su-
pervisor contacted a magistrate, who issued a telephone order to proceed with the
examination. Id. at 547 n.13.
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Justice Rehnquist, while describing her ordeal as "long, uncomfort-
able, indeed humiliating,"2 16 stated, essentially, that she had made
her bed: "[B]oth [the detention's] length and its discomfort resulted
solely from the method by which she chose to smuggle illicit drugs into
this country."217 Nowhere did the majority mention a human dignity
concern arising from the sixteen hour delay preceding the supervising
officer seeking a magistrate's order for a search.
The Court found the search and seizure "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. Remarking on the "veritable national crisis in
law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics,"218 Justice
Rehnquist stated, "the Fourth Amendment balance between the inter-
ests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is also
struck much more favorably to the Government at the border."2 19
Here, Justice Rehnquist expressly noted the sliding balance of inter-
ests (human dignity becomes so frail the majority fails to even men-
tion it) given the administrative imperative of protecting the nation's
borders.
Thus, despite the Court stating that the "overriding" function of
the Fourth Amendment is to "protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwanted intrusions by the State," human dignity lost its bite
as a value in Fourth Amendment bodily intrusion cases during the
War on Drugs. In the 1951 Rochin case, the Court expressed shock at
the involuntary pumping of defendant's stomach to obtain evidence in
a criminal investigation; in Montoya de Hernandez, decided in 1985,
the Court expressed mild concern at lengthy, uncomfortable delay pre-
ceding the examination of defendant's rectum. Surveying these cases
demonstrates that the Court should treat human dignity as a constant
value, despite public opinion and an executive branch agenda advanc-
ing the competing state concern. Though dignity may not always pre-
vail against competing state concerns, it should retain its strength as
a factor in the Court's constitutional decision-making.22o
5. Eighth Amendment Protection Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
The role of human dignity is most troubling in the Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence because, while the Court expresses an unwaver-
216. Id. at 544 (majority opinion).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 539.
219. Id. at 540.
220. As Justice O'Connor noted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (plu-
rality opinion), "lilt is during our most challenging and uncertain moments . ..
that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we
fight abroad." Certainly, and as demonstrated in Part II, advancing human dig-
nity is one the principles (or underlies the principles) for which we fight abroad.
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ing commitment to advancing human dignity in these cases, 22 1 the
Court's analysis of human dignity in most death penalty cases is weak
and meaningless. These cases raise the complex and unsettling ques-
tion of whether inmates on death row have the same inherent dignity
interest as individuals who are not on death row (or the rest of us).
In Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has repeatedly proclaimed
that human dignity underlies the prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment. In Trop v. Dulles,2 22 a case involving forfeiture of
citizenship, the Court stated: "[Tihe basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."22 3 This
language is repeated in eight Supreme Court opinions.2 24 In Trop, the
Petitioner, born in America, had his citizenship forfeited after being
convicted by a court-martial for wartime desertion. In holding the for-
feiture unconstitutional, the Court focused on the "demoralizing' na-
ture of the punishment:
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There
is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society.
It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the
individual the political existence that was centuries in the development....
In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.
2 2 5
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, described expatriation as
"an especially demoralizing sanction."2 26
In Trop, Chief Justice Warren wrote that the Eighth Amendment
is not static but must "draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."227 This no-
tion of an evolving standard of decency repeats in several Eighth
Amendment prisoner rights and death penalty cases.2 28
221. As discussed herein, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which involved a
mentally retarded death row inmate, human dignity concerns appeared to inform
the Court's analysis.
222. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
223. Id. at 100.
224. A LEXIS search revealed eight Supreme Court opinions and forty-four federal
trial and appellate court opinions containing this phrase.
225. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101-02.
226. Id. at 111 (Brennan, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 101 (majority opinion). Justice Warren adopted this notion from Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), in which the Court held unconstitutional the
punishment of twelve years of cadena temporal, working at hard labor with iron
on the ankles, for falsifying public records. In Weems, the Court repeatedly re-
ferred to the Eighth Amendment mandate that punishment must be humane ac-
cording to existing standards of decency. The Weems Court stated that the
Eighth Amendment is "progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice." Id.
at 378.
228. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that Eighth Amendment claims must be evaluated in light of 'contemporary
human knowledge" (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962))); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[An assessment ofcontem-
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In Hope v. Pelzer,2 2 9 forty-four years after Trop, the Court again
relied on human dignity as the grounds for the Eighth Amendment in
striking down an Alabama prison's use of a hitching post as punish-
ment for disruptive conduct. Guards from the Alabama prison system
handcuffed prisoners to hitching posts if they either refused to work or
disrupted their work squads. In holding the practice unconstitu-
tional, 2 30 the Court cited Trop for the idea that what underlies the
Eighth Amendment "is nothing less than the dignity of man."2 3 1 Jus-
tice Stevens described Hope's treatment on the hitching post as "anti-
thetical to human dignity-he was hitched to a post for an extended
period of time in a position that was painful, and under circumstances
that were both degrading and dangerous."232
The Court's analysis of Hope's Eighth Amendment claim is brief,
as the Court focused primarily on the qualified immunity claims of the
prison guards sued by plaintiff. Yet, in analyzing his constitutional
claim, the Court emphasized the lack of necessity of the punishment
and the humiliation flowing the prison guard's handling of Hope:
Despite the clear lack of an emergency situation, the respondents knowingly
subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain
caused by the handcuffs... to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun, to
prolonged thirst and taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that
created a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation.2 3 3
In evaluating the pattern of treatment at the prison, the Court noted
that an inmate had been denied bathroom breaks and defecated on
himself, and corrections officers had taunted prisoners (including
Hope) while refusing their requests for water. The Court in Hope em-
phasized the humiliating nature of this treatment. 2 34
porary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the
application of the Eighth Amendment."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242
(1972) (citing Weems and Trop for the notion that the Eighth Amendment must
draw its meaning from an evolving and enlightened standard of decency).
229. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
230. Id. at 745-46 (rejecting the defendants' qualified immunity claims in Hope's civil
rights action).
231. Id. at 738.
232. Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 738.
234. Id. at 745. Under Jewish Biblical law, punishment can be no more severe than is
necessary to achieve the punitive purpose without unnecessarily humiliating the
offender. Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Of God's Mercy and the
Four Biblical Methods of Capital Punishment: Stoning, Burning, Beheading, and
Strangulation, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1169, 1204 (2004). Regarding flogging, the Torah
mandates strict limits on the number of lashes:
[I]f the guilty one is to be flogged, the magistrate shall have him lie down
and be given lashes in his presence, by count, as his guilt warrants. He
may be given up to forty lashes, but not more, lest being flogged further,
to excess, your brother be degraded before your eyes.
Deuteronomy 25:2-3. Talmudic law limits the number to thirty-nine to avoid ex-
ceeding forty by accident. The commentary states that because the flogging itself
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Relying again on "evolving standards of decency," the Court in At-
kins v. Virginia, 23 5 struck down as unconstitutional the execution of a
mentally retarded convicted felon. Quoting Trop, the Court expressly
acknowledged the role of human dignity in Eighth Amendment deci-
sion-making.23 6 In Atkins the Court noted the "national consensus"
against executing mentally retarded defendants, describing the
"evolving standards of decency" and changing attitudes since the time
of Penry v. Lynaugh 2 3 7 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in At-
kins, hearkened back to the "Bloody Assizes" to illustrate that our
standard for permissible punishment has changed: "A claim that pun-
ishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that prevailed in
1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the 'Bloody Assizes' or when
the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently pre-
vail."238 Although the Court mentioned the term dignity only when
quoting from Trop, the notion of an "evolving standard of decency" in-
formed the Atkins Court's decision.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Roper v. Simmons,239 a
recent case involving executing juvenile offenders. The Court's analy-
sis emphasized the national consensus against executing these offend-
ers as well as the differences between the culpability of juvenile and
adult offenders.2 40 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Roper,
concluded that "[r]etribution is not proportional if the law's most se-
vere penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness
is diminished... by reason of youth and immaturity."2 4 1 Accordingly,
the Court overturned Stanford v. Kentucky,242 in which the Court had
held that executing juvenile offenders comported with the Eighth
Amendment.
Generally, human dignity has not prevailed in outweighing gov-
ernment interests in death penalty cases. 24 3 In Gregg v. Georgia,2 44
is degrading, the concern must be that excessive flogging would lead to something
even more degrading. ETz HAYIM, TORAH AND COMMENTARY 1132 (David L.
Lieber ed., Rabbinical Assembly, 2001).
235. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
236. Id. at 311 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
237. Id. at 316, 321 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
238. Id. at 311.
239. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
240. See id. at 1192-98. The Court noted three general differences between juveniles
under the age of eighteen and adults regarding culpability: (1) juveniles are im-
mature and irresponsible; (2) juveniles are more vulnerable to negative outside
influences like raer pressure; and (3) juveniles' characters are not well formed.
Id. at 1195-96. According to the Court, these qualities render juveniles less cul-
pable. Id.
241. Id. at 1196.
242. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198.
243. The Court has upheld death penalty statutes as constitutional in cases involving
murder. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The Justices have never
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the Court held the Eighth Amendment bars punishments that are
"barbaric" or "excessive" relative to the crime. Justice Stewart, writ-
ing for the plurality, noted that a penalty must accord with the dignity
of man pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. 2 45 This means, Justice
Stewart stated, "the punishment must not be 'excessive.'" 24 6 The
Court outlined the following test for determining whether a punish-
ment is excessive: "A punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if
it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punish-
ment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to
the severity of the crime."24 7 The plurality in Gregg concluded the
punishment of death for deliberate murder was not the purposeless
imposition of severe punishment nor a punishment grossly dispropor-
tionate to the crime. Generally, human dignity concerns fail to govern
the Court's decision-making in the death penalty cases.
The role of human dignity is troubling in the death penalty cases.
The Court's opinion in Atkins focused on human dignity concerns aris-
ing from an evolved moral standard, a national consensus that it is
morally wrong to impose the death penalty on mentally retarded. Yet,
nowhere in Atkins does the Court discuss or describe the particular
indignity suffered by the mentally retarded death row inmate on being
executed. Certainly the Court does not compare the indignity suffered
by the death row inmate who is mentally retarded to the indignity
suffered by the inmate who is not mentally retarded. Rather, despite
couching the decision in terms of human dignity, Justice Stevens
wrote that the mentally retarded defendant is somehow less culpable;
the purposes behind the penalty are not served with the mentally re-
tarded defendant, and the procedural protections are suspect with the
mentally retarded inmate. 248
Presumably, however, executing a death row inmate results in the
same assault on human dignity for the mentally retarded inmate as
held a particular method of capital punishment unconstitutional. See Rosenberg
& Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 1204. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), the Court struck down certain death penalty statutes on grounds the stat-
utes, as applied, were unconstitutionally discretionary and discriminatory. In
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion), the Court held the
death penalty was a grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape.
244. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
245. Id. at 173 (plurality opinion).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002). The objectives underlying the death
penalty are retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at
183 (plurality opinion).
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for the death row inmate who is not mentally retarded.2 49 Yet, in
death penalty cases, human dignity underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment has faltered except with regard to the mentally retarded inmate
and the inmate under the age of eighteen. According to Kant we pos-
sess human dignity because of our ability to reason;2 5 0 yet, the Court
has advanced the dignity of only the death row inmates who lack the
ability or maturity to reason.
To further complicate the question, and as discussed more fully be-
low, in the "right to die" cases, 2 51 the Court has explicitly recognized
human dignity concerns. Given these concerns, the Court has sug-
gested that competent patients have a right to choose whether to re-
fuse unwanted medical treatment when death is imminent. 25 2 Yet,
the Court rejected the comparable human dignity concerns with re-
gard to the incompetent patient.2 53 Thus, the Court has expressed a
willingness to advance the human dignity of the competent patient
but not of the incompetent patient.
Many scholars have noted the tension between the Court's lan-
guage regarding the Eighth Amendment and the Court's decisions in
these cases.2 54 In an article concerning Biblical methods of punish-
ment, Irene and Yale Rosenberg describe this tension as resulting
from the inconsistency between the Court's language and its ac-
tions. 255 The Court requires that the Eighth Amendment gain its
meaning from "evolving standards of decency" and that the punish-
ment accord with the "dignity of man." Yet, if a substantial number of
states allow a certain punishment, the Court will typically uphold the
249. Arguably, the assault on the dignity of the non-mentally retarded inmate may be
stronger because of an increased mental awareness.
250. See Bedau, supra note 26, at 153-54.
251. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), which
involved a constitutional claim by the parents of an incompetent woman to end
her artificial feeding and hydration, Justice Rehnquist described the question as
"whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance re-
ferred to as a 'right to die.'" Id. at 277.
252. Id. at 278 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred
from our prior decisions.").
253. Id. at 283-85.
254. See Bedau, supra note 26, at 148-49 (making a compelling argument that we
cannot understand the Eighth Amendment prohibition without "tacitly embrac-
ing the values it protects"). Bedau asks regarding the Eighth Amendment: "[Is
it possible that our Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishments as a
matter of fundamental rights but without regard to whether doing so protects or
respects human dignity?" Id. at 151. Ultimately, Bedau resolves the tension by
concluding that human dignity, which underlies the Eighth Amendment, is in-
consistent with the death penalty. "A society that understands and respects the
dignity of persons will not pretend that it can empower other human beings in
their official roles as agents of the criminal justice system to exact such a forfei-
ture [one's very status as a person]." Id. at 177.
255. Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 1202-03.
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state law. 25 6 Thus, though the Court requires that the penalty not be
excessive and that it preserve human dignity, the state is not required
to choose the least severe punishment.25 7
The Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is also troubling
because, more so than in other constitutional jurisprudence, the
Court's language regarding the Eighth Amendment belies the out-
come. The Court, while expressly describing human dignity as under-
lying the Eighth Amendment, has upheld most death penalty
statutes, stating that public morality questions should be left to the
legislature.25s Twice in Gregg, Justice Stewart reminded the reader
that public perception of the death penalty is not the sole considera-
tion: "The court also must ask whether it comports with the basic con-
cept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment."25 9 Yet the
Court contemplated the role of human dignity, this guiding precept, in
words only, as nowhere in its analysis does the Court weigh human
dignity concerns against the state's interests in deterrence, retribu-
tion, and incapacitation. 2 6 0
The Eighth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates the need for
the Court to develop a test or standard for consistent decision-making
with regard to human dignity. Specifically, the Court must decide
whether human dignity concerns should apply, regardless of public
opinion concerning whether human dignity should be advanced. At
present, the Court's language regarding human dignity underlying
the Eighth Amendment is meaningless. The Court needs a cogent
method for determining whether human dignity concerns should pre-
vail in death penalty and other Eighth Amendment cases.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1202.
258. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[11n assessing a
punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitu-
tional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require the legislature to
select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cru-
elly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved."). The Court is thus
adhering to the public opinion concerning the need to advance the dignity of the
death row inmate.
259. Id. at 182. Earlier in the opinion, Justice Stewart wrote that "public perceptions
of standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A
penalty must also accord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment.'" Id. at 173.
260. In Gregg, the Court made clear that the death penalty is to serve "two principal
purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders."
Id. at 183. Retribution, according to the Court, "is no longer the dominant objec-
tive of the criminal law." Id. The Court in Gregg refered to the evidence on deter-
rence as inconclusive: 'Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death
penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great
deal of debate. The results simply have been inconclusive." Id. at 184-85.
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6. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection
Claims Involving an Individual's Ability to Choose
How and When to Die When Death Is
Imminent
The Court has repeatedly acknowledged human dignity concerns
regarding constitutional claims in "right to die"26 1 and physician-as-
sisted suicide cases. The Court has framed the human dignity con-
cerns as involving privacy and autonomy against unwanted bodily
intrusions and as allowing terminally ill patients to die without un-
necessary pain and suffering. However, in the cases to date, the Court
has yet to decide these human dignity concerns outweigh government
interests in the cases involving a patient's "right to die" or to assis-
tance in dying.2 62
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,263 which in-
volved a parents' request to withdraw life-sustaining measures from
their incompetent daughter, the Court, in a five to four decision, con-
cluded that the State of Missouri could require clear and convincing
evidence of an incompetent patient's wish concerning the withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment. By doing so, the Court rejected the "right
to die" of Nancy Cruzan, who was rendered incompetent by injuries
sustained in an automobile accident. While acknowledging Cruzan's
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, the Court
held that government interests26 4 outweighed Cruzan's liberty con-
cerns. "In sum, we conclude that a State may apply a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to
discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diagnosed to be in a
persistent vegetative state."26 5 Thus, the Court required the contin-
ued feeding of Nancy Cruzan. Despite ruling for the state with regard
to Nancy Cruzan, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, rec-
ognized that a competent person has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse unwanted
261. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) (regarding
the term "right to die").
262. The public debate concerning Theresa Schiavo has certainly demonstrated the
need for guidance from the Court on these issues. See Michael P. Allen, The Con-
stitution at the Threshold of Life and Death: A Suggested Approach to Accommo-
date an Interest in Life and a Right to Die, 53 Am. U. L. REV. 971 (2004); Barbara
A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U.
MiAmi L. REV. 107 (2004).
263. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
264. The Court cited the following governmental interests regarding the Missouri
statute: (1) the state's interest in safeguarding the personal element of choosing
to die; (2) the state's interest in guarding against potential abuses; and (3) the
state's interest in preserving life. Id. at 281-83.
265. Id. at 284.
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medical treatment.2 66 "But for purposes of this case, we assume that
the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a con-
stitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutri-
tion."26 7 Because of the absence of an informed and voluntary choice,
however, an incompetent person lacks the same right.268
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, rejected the majority's "clear and
convincing" evidence standard in light of what Justice Brennan de-
scribed as Cruzan's "fundamental right to be free of unwanted nutri-
tion and hydration."2 69 Justice Brennan detailed what he described
as the indignity of Cruzan's circumstances. 2 70 Justice Brennan
phrased his concern in terms of human dignity: "Nancy Cruzan is en-
titled to choose to die with dignity."2 71 "For many, the thought of an
ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bod-
ily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence."272
Similarly, Justice Stevens, dissenting, began his constitutional in-
quiry by stating, "we have construed the Due Process Clause to pre-
clude physically invasive recoveries of evidence not only because such
procedures are 'brutal' but also because they are 'offensive to human
dignity."' 2 73 Justice Stevens went on to describe the sanctity and pri-
vacy of the human body as "fundamental to liberty." Accordingly, Jus-
tice Stevens concluded Missouri's treatment of Cruzan was unjust and
unconstitutional. 2 74
Seven years after the Court acknowledged the right of competent
persons to refuse unwanted treatment, in companion cases involving
physician-assisted suicide, Washington v. Glucksberg27 5 and Vacco v.
266. Id. at 278 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred
from prior decisions.").
267. Id. at 279.
268. Id. at 286-87. Nancy Cruzan died five months after the Court's decision. After
the Court's decision, Cruzan's family brought new evidence of her wishes to die to
a state trial court. In light of this new evidence (testimony from friends who had
not come forward sooner because they knew Cruzan only by her married name),
the state did not oppose removing the feeding tube. The court ruled in favor of
the family. See MARK A. HALL ET AL., BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAw 269 n.1
(2005).
269. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 301. Justice Brennan described Cruzan's physical condition in detail, in-
cluding how she was fed through a tube in her stomach.
271. Id. at 302.
272. Id. at 311 (citing Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635-36
(Mass. 1986), for the notion that a state's duty to preserve life must recognize an
individual's right to avoid circumstances in which the individual himself would
feel that efforts to sustain life demean or degrade his humanity).
273. Id. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952)).
274. Id. at 344.
275. 421 U.S. 702 (1997).
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Quill,276 the Court held there is no constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide. The statute at issue in Glucksberg, Washington's
Natural Death Act, prohibited "aiding another person to attempt sui-
cide."2 77 The New York statute, cited in Vacco, prohibited "intention-
ally causing or aiding another person to commit suicide."278 In
Glucksberg, the plaintiffs sued under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; the plaintiffs in Vacco pursued the case
under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Rehnquist described the
constitutional issue in both cases as whether liberty includes a right to
commit suicide and, if so, whether the right includes a right to assis-
tance in doing so. 27 9
The Court held against the plaintiffs in both cases, finding no right
to physician-assisted suicide.28 0 The Court weighed the patient's lib-
erty interest against the competing state interests in preserving life,
protecting the "integrity and ethics of the medical profession,"2s 1 pro-
tecting vulnerable groups from abuse and mistakes, and ensuring that
permitting suicide does not lead to involuntary euthanasia. 28 2 The
Court distinguished the issue in Cruzan, which the Court described as
involving a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,
from the issue regarding the right to assistance in hastening death.283
Justice Stevens, whose strong dissent in Cruzan focused on human
dignity concerns and the related assault on Cruzan's liberty,28 4 con-
curred in Glucksberg and Vacco. Justice Stevens again tied a person's
constitutional right to refuse treatment to human dignity. He dis-
agreed with Justice Rehnquist's notion of a common law right to re-
fuse treatment.28 5 Justice Stevens viewed petitioners' claims as
protecting matters "central to personal dignity and autonomy."2 8 6
Justice Stevens described the right to refuse treatment as "an aspect
of a far broader and more basic concept of freedom that is even older
276. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
277. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1994).
278. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.15 (McKinney 1987).
279. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
280. Justice Rehnquist described the state interests in the Washington statute as fol-
lows: (1) preserving life; (2) protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical pro-
fession; (3) protecting vulnerable groups from abuse, neglect, and mistakes; and
(4) ensuring that assisted suicide will not start it down a path toward voluntary
and perhaps involuntary euthanasia. Id. at 729-33.
281. Id. at 731.
282. Id. at 732.
283. Id. at 725-26.
284. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 344 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("Choices about death touch the core of liberty .... The decision we review
thereby interferes with constitutional interests of the highest order.").
285. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 742 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 744 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
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than the common law."28 7 Justice Stevens, like Justice Brennan,
viewed preserving human dignity as central to constitutional decision-
making.
Despite ruling for the government in these "right to die" and physi-
cian-assisted suicide cases, the Court has acknowledged a constitu-
tional right to die with dignity in terms of avoiding suffering at the
time of death.288 Justices O'Connor and Breyer specifically noted that
the laws of New York and Washington do not prevent the provision of
palliative care, stating the statutes "do not prohibit doctors from pro-
viding patients with drugs sufficient to control pain."289 According to
one commentator, "a majority of the Court . . . clearly accepted that
dying individuals have a right to be free of unnecessary pain and suf-
fering at the end of life."29o
In Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco, the Court suggested that a com-
petent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under
the Fourteenth Amendment to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
This liberty interest arises out of human dignity concerns-a person's
ability to control decisions involving his body, and a person's right to
freedom from unnecessary pain and suffering.
From a human dignity perspective, the Court's distinction between
the liberty interests of the incompetent person whose death is immi-
nent and the competent person in like circumstances is more sound
than in the death penalty cases. If, as Kant posited, our human dig-
nity flows from our ability to reason,2 9 1 the Court's opinions may
demonstrate that the Court has less concern for the dignity of an in-
competent person whose death is imminent than for a competent per-
son in the same circumstances. In the death penalty cases, the
situation is reversed; the Court demonstrates more concern for the
human dignity of the incompetent death row inmate than for the com-
petent one. Yet if, as William Parent posits, every individual's human
dignity provides his moral status to challenge state action that de-
means or humiliates regardless of his competency, human dignity
287. Id. at 743.
288. See id. at 738 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("There is no dispute that dying patients
in Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so
would hasten their deaths."). Justice Breyer stated the Court would need to re-
visit its conclusions in the physician-assisted suicide cases if the state law pre-
vented provision of palliative care, "including the administration of drugs as
needed to avoid pain at the end of life." Id. at 792 (Breyer, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Breyer, in his concurrence, suggested that dying with dignity means avoiding
severe physical pain at the time of death. See id. at 790.
289. Id. at 791.
290. David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians: Physician-Assisted Suicide After Gluck-
sberg/Quill, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 161, 223 (1999).
291. See Bedau, supra note 26, at 148-49.
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should either prevail or not in the death penalty or right to die
cases.
29 2
7. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection
Right to Economic Assistance
In 1970, four years after Justice Brennan wrote the opinion up-
holding the constitutionality of a mandatory blood test for a criminally
accused, Justice Brennan wrote the Court's decision in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 2 9 3 a case involving welfare recipients whose benefits were being
terminated. 294 In a suit brought by the commissioner of social ser-
vices, the Court ruled that a prior evidentiary hearing must be held
before terminating benefits of welfare recipients. The Court agreed
with the lower court that only a fair hearing prior to terminating wel-
fare benefits satisfied due process. Terminating benefits while the
commission was determining eligibility deprives recipients "of the
very means necessary to live while he waits."295
In the Court's opinion, Justice Brennan linked the petitioner's con-
stitutional claim to living with human dignity. "From its founding the
Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-
being of all persons within its border."296 Justice Brennan went on to
describe the impact of the state's failure to provide public assistance:
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within
the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, wel-
fare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread
sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not
mere charity, but a means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.'2 9 7
According to some, Justice Brennan established a new concept of
dignity in Goldberg: "[H]e was harnessing the power of the moral vi-
sion of vindicating human dignity and putting it to work to drive the
constitutional engine in the decisions of the Supreme Court .... The
Goldberg holding moved the human dignity focus to a realm beyond
292. Obviously, other factors, such as the competing government interests, impact the
Court's decision. Yet it is hard to see how these interests differ in the right to die
and death penalty cases depending on the competency of the individual at issue.
293. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
294. In a string of welfare rights cases, lawyers sought to establish a "right to live,"
requiring the federal government to guarantee a minimum standard of living to
all citizens. See Hirsch, supra note 112, at 110 n.9. The welfare rights movement
is often compared to the civil rights movement in terms of legal process used to
fight for welfare reform. Hirsch posits that the Supreme Court's pattern of ac-
cepting and rejecting these constitutional claims reflects differences in how the
Justices view whether economic opportunities are available to the poor.
295. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266.
296. Id. at 264-65 (emphasis added).
297. Id. at 265.
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the criminal justice system."2 98 Yet, by 1970, the Court had repeat-
edly identified human dignity as the grounds for constitutional rights
to privacy and Fourth Amendment protections. Goldberg fell in line
with these holdings.
After Goldberg, the Court's willingness to advance human dignity
in welfare rights cases faltered. In Dandridge v. Williams,2 99 the
Court rejected the notion that the "maximum grant" provision of Ma-
ryland's Aid to Families With Dependent Children, by which families,
no matter the number of children, could receive only a certain amount
of benefits, 30 0 violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court ap-
plied a rational basis test to the constitutional analysis rather than
treating the classification (families with greater numbers of children)
as requiring a compelling state interest. In their dissent, Justices
Brennan and Marshall chided the majority for using the same consti-
tutional test used for business regulations for "the literally vital inter-
ests of a powerless minority-poor families without breadwinners."3o1
In United States v. Kras,3 02 a case strikingly similar to Boddie v.
Connecticut,303 the Court upheld the fee provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act in a challenge by an indigent petitioner in bankruptcy. The Court
held that Boddie did not extend to no-asset bankruptcy proceedings,
as no fundamental interest (marriage in Boddie) depended on availa-
bility of a discharge in bankruptcy. 304 The Court also rejected the
equal protection argument, holding that bankruptcy was not a funda-
mental right, and the legislation did not "touch upon .. .the suspect
criteria of race, nationality, or alienage."3 05
The most startling rejection of human dignity as a value in the wel-
fare rights cases occurred in Harris v. McRae.306 In Harris, a class of
pregnant women sued, claiming the Hyde Amendment of the Medicaid
298. Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice
Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 231-32 (1998).
299. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
300. Certain dependent children would thus receive no aid if the other dependents had
received the benefits of the maximum amount.
301. Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Rather than explicitly defining the benefits
sought as a "fundamental right," the dissenters urged that the Court should have
decided the proper test based on the character of the classification of those in-
volved; the relative importance to individuals in the discriminated class of the
benefits they do not receive; and the asserted state interests. "At the same time,
the Court's insistence that equal protection analysis turns on the basis of a closed
category of 'fundamental rights' involves a curious value judgment." Id. at 521
n.14. The dissenting Justices cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as a source for the notion that there is a "right" to welfare assistance. Id.
302. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
303. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
304. Kras, 409 U.S. at 446 ("There is no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of
one's debts in bankruptcy.").
305. Id.
306. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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program violated the equal protection guarantees of the Due Process
Clause by denying them funding for medically necessary abortions. At
issue was whether the Medicaid program, which subsidizes a woman's
medically necessary services, could fail to subsidize a medically neces-
sary abortion.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional claim, holding that
due process does not confer entitlement to federal funds for the pro-
tected right to have an abortion. The Court held as follows:
[R]egardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her
pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due pro-
cess liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman's free-
dom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial
resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices.
3 0 7
While human dignity prevailed in allowing women freedom to choose
whether to terminate a pregnancy, human dignity was outweighed
when the government had to get involved by paying for that
freedom.308
Justice Marshall, dissenting in McRae, referred to the Hyde
Amendment as "the product of an effort to deny to the poor the consti-
tutional right recognized in Roe v. Wade."3 09 Justice Marshall linked
the outcome to the Court's "unwillingness to apply the constraints of
the Constitution to decisions involving the expenditure of governmen-
tal funds."31 0 While not using the term human dignity, Justice Mar-
shall reflected on a welfare recipient's dilemma to either have the
child or obtain a "back-alley" abortion.31 1 Justice Blackmun, in his
dissent, described as "condescension" the Court's statement that a
medicare recipient faced with needing a medically necessary abortion
"may go elsewhere for her abortion."3 12
The welfare rights decisions are troubling with regard to the role of
human dignity. While human dignity underlying a woman's right to
choose prevailed in cases like Roe, Carey, and Carhart, the majority
failed to even mention the word dignity in McRae, which involved the
state's need to subsidize this protection. The dissenting Justices in
307. Id. at 316.
308. Id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, the result today may be traced
to the Court's unwillingness to apply the constraints of the Constitution to deci-
sions involving the expenditure of funds."). Again, these case are distinct in that
a petitioner is seeking the state's interference, to provide financial assistance,
rather than objecting to state interference as unconstitutional. With regard to
the original definition of human dignity, these cases do not comfortably fit, as
there is no state action that demeans or humiliates (although arguably state ac-
tion may lead to economic dependence). Petitioners in these cases are seeking
state action to advance their human dignity.
309. Id. at 338.
310. Id. at 347.
311. Id. at 337.
312. Id. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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McRae described the unfairness, "condescension," and demeaning na-
ture of the statute at issue.313
As shown, human dignity has proven frail as a constitutional value
in cases involving the government's provision of economic assistance.
In Goldberg, Justice Brennan commenced a path in which the Court,
looking through the due process lens, relied on a national "commit-
ment" to assure the human dignity of all citizens by providing a mini-
mum standard of life. Yet, dignity as a constitutional value has not
succeeded in outweighing competing state economic interests, particu-
larly where the state must take steps to interfere. During the past
thirty-five years, the Court has typically reversed lower court deci-
sions favoring the poor.31 4 These rulings reflect that, constitutionally
speaking, the state need not take affirmative steps to protect and pre-
serve human dignity.
8. First Amendment Right to Free Speech and Protection of an
Individual's Public Image, as Against Another's First
Amendment Right to Free Speech
In Cohen v. California,315 the infamous four-letter word on peti-
tioner's jacket case, Justice Harlan emphasized the purpose of pre-
serving human dignity. According to Justice Harlan, open debate, and
the "verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance" sometimes
associated with such debate, signifies the nation's strength.31 6 Citing
the concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. Califor-
nia,3 17 Justice Harlan noted that freedom of expression "will ulti-
mately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and
... no other approach would comport with the premise of individual
313. Justice Blackmun joined the dissenting opinion of Justices Brennan and Stevens.
In his separate dissenting opinion, he referred to the Court's holding that a wo-
man "may go elsewhere for her abortion" as "condescension," "disingenuous," and
"alarming." Id.
314. See Matthew Diller, Law and Equality: Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1401, 1421 n.96 (1995) ("For the past fifteen years, Supreme Court
decisions on public benefits issues have mostly taken the form of reversals of
lower court decisions in favor of poor people." (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S.
478 (1990); Lyng v. Int'l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587 (1987); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987); Lukhard v. Reed, 481
U.S. 368 (1987))). In general, the Court has failed to heed human dignity con-
cerns in the welfare rights decisions. The exception is Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971), decided soon after Goldberg, in which the Court held due process
prohibited Connecticut from denying access to state courts based solely on inabil-
ity to pay.
315. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
316. Id. at 24-25.
317. 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ('Those who won our inde-
pendence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop
their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.").
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dignity and choice upon which our political system rests."318 The
Court in Cohen held that petitioner's conviction for engaging in offen-
sive conduct through vulgar language should be reversed, as peti-
tioner's speech was not "fighting words" likely to promote violence.3 19
Similarly, in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.,320 Justice Stevens highlighted the two objectives of preserving
human dignity through First Amendment freedom of expression: "The
First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is
not only an aspect of individual liberty-and thus a good unto itself-
but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of
society as a whole."3 2 1 Bose filed a disparagement action based on an
evaluation of its loudspeaker by Consumer Reports. The Court held
the language did not fall outside the scope of the "majestic protec-
tion"32 2 afforded by the First Amendment.
On the opposing side of freedom of expression, in libel/reputational
injury decisions, the dignity described by the Court differs somewhat
from the human dignity described in the privacy/liberty interest,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In the libel
cases, the Court emphasizes the reputational aspect of human dignity,
an aspect similar to the right to the free unfolding of personality
under the German constitutional system.3 23 In these cases, the Court
weighs human dignity concerns arising out of an alleged libel against
competing First Amendment concerns. 3 24
318. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
319. Id. at 20. The Court also noted that those who were offended by the conduct
could simply look away. Id. at 22.
320. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985), Justice Brennan, in his dissent, cited Bose for the notion that
"freedom of expression is not only essential to check tyranny and foster self-gov-
ernment but also intrinsic to individual liberty and dignity and instrumental in
society's search for truth." Id. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
321. Bose, 466 U.S. at 503.
322. Id. at 504. The Court spent much of the opinion analyzing the actual malice stan-
dard and the need for independent appellate review of the language at issue in
the case.
323. See Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and
American Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 971 (discussing the notion
of outward focused human dignity in contrast to inward focused dignity in Ger-
man and American jurisprudence). In the German constitutional system,
"[h]uman dignity is the central value." Id. Article 1(1) of the Basic Law states
that "'the dignity of man shall be inviolable.'" Id. German personality law has
two components: freedom of action (which includes protecting activities like free-
dom to travel or to pursue a sport or occupation) and protection of a personal
sphere (which includes protecting privacy, informational self-determination, and
control over one's portrayal in society).
324. These cases also differ from the remaining types because the state does not inflict
the alleged injury.
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In Rosenblatt v. Baer,3 25 a journalist challenged a judgment
awarding damages to a county building supervisor based on an alleg-
edly libelous story in which the journalist alleged the supervisor over-
spent public funds on a public facility. Having recently adopted the
New York Times v. Sullivan326 test, the Court held the building super-
visor was a public figure and thus could not recover damages based on
the proof adduced at trial. The Court remanded the case for retrial on
the actual malice issue.
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, championed "the right
of a man to the protection of his own reputation."3 27 This right, ac-
cording to Justice Stewart, "reflects no more than our basic concept of
the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."328 Justice Stewart
acknowledged that the protection of private personality is left prima-
rily to the individual states. "But this does not mean that the right is
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitu-
tional system."329 Although the First Amendment prevailed in gov-
erning the outcome in Rosenblatt, Justice Stewart described dignity,
meaning the protection of an individual's reputation, as a constitu-
tional value.
Ten years after Rosenblatt, Justice Brennan reaffirmed the notion
of dignity underlying the right to protection of one's reputation. In
Paul v. Davis,33 0 the Court held a criminally accused could not sustain
a § 1983 action against a police chief who circulated a flier on which
the accused's mug shot was displayed. The photo was taken at the
time of the accused's arrest for a prior offense. The accused included a
libel action in his civil rights suit, claiming the police department in-
jured his reputation by publishing the photo.
The Court rejected the defamation claim. Without injury to tangi-
ble interests or state provided rights, the alleged libel did not suffice to
invoke the accused's due process right. Justice Brennan dissented, re-
ferring to the right to enjoy one's good name and reputation, falling
within the concept of personal "liberty."331 Justice Brennan recalled
the words of Justice Stewart that an individual's right to protect her
name reflects "no more than the basic concept of the essential worth
and dignity of every human being."332
325. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
326. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
327. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
328. Id. (emphasis added).
329. Id.
330. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
331. Id. at 723 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
332. Id.
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This notion of dignity, which underlies the right to protection of
personality, is like the notion of dignity in German constitutional ju-
risprudence. This dignity lacks the fortitude of the dignity underlying
our right to privacy and the Fourth Amendment, as, to date, human
dignity as a reputational interest has not prevailed against the coun-
tervailing interest in First Amendment freedom of expression.
The interesting flip side of the failure of human dignity concerns to
prevail in Rosenblatt and Paul is William Parent's notion that dignity
underlies the First Amendment right to free speech. "[I]t serves to
prohibit unjust personal denigration in the form of coerced silence im-
posed on despised minorities. The government may not distribute free
speech in ways that are arbitrarily contemptuous of individual
citizens."333
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING
WHETHER HUMAN DIGNITY CONCERNS
SHOULD PREVAIL
Rather than following public opinion and executive branch impera-
tives, the Court should consistently and expressly recognize human
dignity as that which underlies certain constitutional rights.3 34 Re-
turning to the definition in Part II, human dignity as a constitutional
value is a moral status affording individuals rights and standing
against state action that demeans, offends, or humiliates. My goal in
this Article is to underscore the need for the Court to persist in relying
on human dignity as part of existing constitutional standards by treat-
ing human dignity as a value of constant strength. By doing so, the
Court will guide lower courts in their decision-making, 335 ease the
333. Parent, supra note 43, at 69.
334. Some may contend the Court does not include human dignity in constitutional
standards because the value is so subjective that the Justices will forever disa-
gree on whether human dignity is even at issue in a case. Yet, the same could be
said for every constitutional guarantee. The Justices have certainly disagreed on
whether a person's liberty interest/right to privacy is at stake or whether a case
even touches on equal protection concerns. In every case of constitutional inter-
pretation, the Justices must decide whether constitutional rights or interests are
implicated. The Justices can decide, and repeatedly have decided, whether a con-
stitutional claim involves a petitioner's human dignity.
335. According to commentators, "[tihere are three main functions that a judicial opin-
ion serves: first, to give guidance to other judges, lawyers, and the general public
about what the law is; second, to discipline the judge's deliberative process with a
public account of the decision . . . and, third, to persuade the court's audiences
that the court did the right thing." Gewirtz, supra note 109, at 1039. My review
of circuit court decisions shows substantial inconsistency in the role of human
dignity in constitutional jurisprudence among the circuit courts. A LEXIS search
of the term human dignity along with constitution revealed many more uses in
the Ninth Circuit than in the Fifth Circuit. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit search
yielded thirteen decisions. An identical search in the Fifth Circuit produced two
decisions. In the Seventh Circuit, the search revealed one case. Though not sci-
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tension in existing constitutional jurisprudence, and advance the goal
of consistency and sound reasoning in its decision-making. 336
In Hope, the prison inmate tied to the hitching post case, and in
Atkins, which involved executing the mentally retarded, human dig-
nity played an express role in the Court's Eighth Amendment deci-
sion-making. Under the constitutional test in Atkins and Hope, the
Court recognized human dignity as that which gives content to the
Eighth Amendment, factoring human dignity into its analysis of the
excessiveness of the punishment. In weighing the interests at stake,
Justice Stevens included Hope's human dignity: "Despite the clear
lack of an emergency situation, the respondents knowingly subjected
him to . . .unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs . . .and to a
deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular dis-
comfort and humiliation."33 7
Yet, in death penalty cases such as Gregg, the Court adhered to
popular opinion in deciding whether the punishment was excessive
only in light of fulfilling the government objectives of deterrence and
retribution. 3 38 Nowhere in Gregg did the Court view excessiveness as
it relates to human dignity by considering whether a less demeaning
and offensive punishment (presumably, life imprisonment) would sat-
isfy the government's goals.
The Eighth Amendment requires a punishment "accord with the
dignity of man."339 Under this standard, the Court should strike
down a punishment as excessive when it causes pain, demeans, humil-
entific, these search results show an uncertainty on the part of the circuit courts
concerning whether to afford the value weight in constitutional decision-making.
336. I am not joining the debate about whether the Court engages in (or should engage
in) "principled" decision-making. See Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Ap-
pearing Principled, 37 ARiz. L. REV. 1107, 1151 (1995) (arguing that for a decision
to succeed in justifying the result for which it is offered, "it must appear princi-
pled"); Peller, supra note 149, at 562 ("The passage I have quoted is the culmina-
tion of Wechsler's argument that Brown v. Board of Education and other
decisions outlawing racial segregation were illegitimate because the controversy
lacked a 'principled' resolution."); Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial
Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1983) ("Decision according to principle, then, is
decision according to a publicly stated ground that is consistent with the grounds
the judge uses to decide other cases."). I mean to argue only that the Court's
decision regarding a particular constitutional claim should be intellectually
sound when compared to another decision regarding the same constitutional
claim.
337. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002).
338. The primary government objectives of the death penalty are retribution and de-
terrence. Incapacitation is also a stated objective, though not a primary one. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
339. Hope, 536 U.S. at 737 ("The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain... consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment."
(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986))); Atkins v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
304, 311 (2002); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion) (holding "excessive-
ness" has two components: first, the punishment cannot involve the unnecessary
790 [Vol. 84:740
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iates, or offends a defendant either arbitrarily or more than is neces-
sary to satisfy the stated purpose of the punishment. Accordingly, the
Court would strike down a death penalty statute unless the govern-
ment could show that a less demeaning or humiliating punishment
would not serve the intended purposes of the statute.3 40 The Court
would also consider whether the statute arbitrarily impacted a partic-
ular group under this test. If life imprisonment, presumably less
demeaning than death, would the serve the statute's goals of deter-
rence and retribution as effectively as the death penalty, the death
penalty would not survive constitutional muster. If life imprisonment
would not satisfy these purposes, the death penalty statute would
survive.
Ultimately this standard may not lead to different results. In At-
kins, the government would have been required to show that life im-
prisonment-presumably less humiliating and demeaning than
death-would not serve the statute's purposes for the statute to sur-
vive. The Court would thus consider the effectiveness of deterrence
and retribution with regard to the mentally retarded offender in light
of the punishment's assault on his dignity. If these purposes would be
served as effectively with life imprisonment, the less demeaning pun-
ishment, the Court would find the statute unconstitutional. Such a
test would reconcile the Court's Eighth Amendment language with its
decisions by making human dignity a part of the constitutional stan-
dard. Presumably, the Court in Atkins would reach the same
result.341
In Gregg, the government would have had to make the same show-
ing for the statute to pass muster with regard to the non-mentally
retarded inmate. The government would again try to convince the
Court that life imprisonment would not produce the same societal re-
sults as the death penalty. Applying this test, the Court would con-
sider the societal interests in the death penalty in light of the impact
and wanton infliction of pain, and second, the punishment must not be grossly
disproportionate to the crime).
340. The Court currently does not require the least severe penalty. Gregg, 428 U.S. at
175 (plurality opinion). Further, the evidence concerning the effectiveness of the
death penalty as a deterrent is, according to the Court, inconclusive. Id. at 184
("Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent to
crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great deal of debate. The results
simply have been inconclusive."). Of course, considering the human dignity of the
death row inmate is ludicrous to some. Yet, the Court has certainly considered
the dignity of the mentally retarded death row inmate in its decision-making.
The very notion at the heart of the Eighth Amendment is, according to the Court,
the dignity of man. Thus, consistent with this notion, the Court should include
human dignity in its analysis.
341. Arguably, the Court's analysis was very similar to that proposed here. The Court
determined that with the mentally retarded offender, the purposes were not ef-
fectively served.
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on the human dignity of the offender. Accordingly, rather than deter-
mining the constitutionality of death penalty statutes based on the
number of states allowing the practice, the Court would decide based
on whether a punishment taking less of a toll on the dignity of the
offender could still serve the statute's purposes. This analysis would
give meaning to the Court's often-repeated statement that "[t]he basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man."34 2
Similarly, with regard to the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Court should not only formulate but also apply its
constitutional standard to include human dignity. With regard to
Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence, the Court
should use its current "reasonableness" test, while explicitly including
in reasonableness the impact of government action on the defendant's
dignity. In Montoya de Hernandez, for example, the Fourth Amend-
ment case involving the woman suspected of smuggling drugs whom
authorities detained at the Los Angeles airport for approximately
twenty-four hours before having her examined for drugs, the govern-
ment would have been required to show the lengthy detention was
reasonable in view of the humiliation and degradation she suffered. In
all likelihood, the outcome in Montoya de Hernandez would differ us-
ing this standard, as evidence revealed that the airport officials failed
to even seek a warrant until approximately sixteen hours after she
was detained.34 3 She was not examined until approximately twenty-
seven hours after her ordeal began. Thus, the search was unreasona-
ble, as it should have been (and could have been) conducted without
humiliating and demeaning de Hernandez by detaining her incommu-
nicado in a room at the Los Angeles airport for twenty-four hours
before she was searched.
Rather than recommending new constitutional tests, this Article
urges the Court to recognize and rely on human dignity within ex-
isting constitutional standards. Human dignity is unique in that the
Court has repeatedly described it as that which gives meaning to our
constitutional rights. If, as the Court has repeatedly stated, the "over-
riding" function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect human dig-
nity, the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment" is human
dignity, "part of the constitutional liberty to choose" is human dignity,
and human dignity is the "constitutional foundation" underlying the
342. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 392 (1989); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 180 (plurality
opinion).
343. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 532-35, 547-49 (1985).
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that customs officials sought a
court order from a magistrate sixteen hours after her flight had landed. Justice
Brennan stated that after almost twenty-four hours had passed, "someone finally
had the presence of mind to consult a Magistrate and to obtain a court order for
an x-ray and a body-cavity search." Id. at 547 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Fifth Amendment, the Court must nurture human dignity as part of
the standards for these amendments.
Two recent cases, Lawrence and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,34 4 demon-
strate the Court moving in this direction of treating human dignity as
a value having invariant strength in its decision-making. In Law-
rence, the Court treated human dignity as an integral part of the lib-
erty interest at stake. What is novel about Lawrence is not the Court's
reliance on human dignity, but the Court's explicit reference to human
dignity as a guiding precept. Rather than speaking of only a liberty
interest, the Court explicitly referred to preserving human dignity as
part of that liberty.34 5 American constitutional jurisprudence has
thus advanced to a point where the Court will speak openly about the
role of human dignity.3 46
Hamdi also signifies a shift. In Hamdi, Justice O'Connor, writing
for the plurality, failed to speak in terms of human dignity. Yet, the
outcome, requiring that citizen-detainees receive fair notice of the fac-
tual basis for their classification as enemy combatants and a fair hear-
ing before a neutral decision-maker, demonstrates that human dignity
partially shaped the decision. In sharp contrast to Korematsu347 and
Hirabayashi,348 the Court in Hamdi did not end its analysis by grant-
ing unlimited discretion to the military in detaining American citizens
suspected of enemy activity. Rather, the Court imbued Hamdi's con-
stitutional liberty interest with value-the need to preserve Hamdi's
human dignity, despite the ongoing military conflict.
Justice O'Connor described Hamdi's liberty interest as "the most
elemental of liberty interests-the interest in being free from physical
detention by one's own government."3 49 She wrote of the "Values that
this country holds dear" and the "privilege that is American citizen-
ship."350 In contrast, nowhere in Korematsu and Hirabayahsi did the
Court even acknowledge the petitioners' constitutional rights and
guarantees. 3 5 1
344. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
345. See supra section III.B in which the Lawrence Court's statements regarding dig-
nity are detailed.
346. Presumably, the Court has at times failed to speak of human dignity because the
term sounds "emotional" or too "personal."
347. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See supra section III.A for a
detailed discussion of the case.
348. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
349. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion).
350. Id. at 532.
351. In Hirabayashi, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Stone, described the
solidarity of Japanese citizens and their failure to assimilate. The Court de-
scribed Japanese language schools in the United States as "sources of Japanese
propaganda, cultivating allegiance to Japan." Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 97.
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The role of human dignity cannot be discerned in the Court's deci-
sion-making in the economic assistance decisions. Likewise, the
Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence is troubling because
the Court speaks of human dignity as that which underlies the Eighth
Amendment, weighing human dignity against the competing state
concerns in words only. Nowhere in the Court's excessiveness analy-
sis does the Court weigh the toll on human dignity against the stated
objectives.
Presumably, however, our standard of decency continues to
evolve.352 If the evolution is slow, but steady, human dignity will rou-
tinely weigh into the Court's constitutional analysis as a value having
a constant strength (rather than varying in strength according to pop-
ular opinion) during the next fifty years. Our legal landscape will
thus reflect increasing concern for the human dignity of all individuals
who seek the Constitution's protection.
352. The reason the Court is only beginning to speak openly of human dignity may lie
in the notion of "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society." Regarding human rights and civil liberties, our constitutional ju-
risprudence is barely beyond infancy. As Justice O'Connor wrote in her book The
Majesty of Law, the Supreme Court, which first sat in 1790, did not assume its
role with regard to creating and defending individual liberties until "more than
150 years after the adoption of the Bill of Rights and more than 75 years after
Congress enacted the Civil War Amendments." Beginning in the 1940s, the
Court undertook handling cases involving civil liberties. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR,
THE MAJESTY OF THE LAw 263-64 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003). Today, the Supreme
Court considers cases involving civil liberties in constitutional jurisprudence dur-
ing every term.
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